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CHOICE-OF-LAW, VENUE, AND CONSENT-TO-
JURISDICTION PROVISIONS IN CALIFORNIA
COMMERCIAL LENDING AGREEMENTS:
CAN GOOD DRAFTSMANSHIP OVERCOME BAD
CHOICE-OF-LAW DOCTRINE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year in the United States, thousands of businesses enter into
commercial lending agreements.' Many of those businesses maximize fi-
nancing opportunities2 by borrowing from lenders outside the state in
which they operate.' Often, this may involve lenders from jurisdictions
whose laws governing commercial lending agreements are substantially
different from the laws of the state in which the borrower does business.4
In such instances, there may be a question as to which state's laws should
govern the lending agreement if a dispute arises between the parties.
To enable both borrowers and lenders to plan more effectively by
bringing an element of certainty into such multistate transactions, 5 par-
ties may include contractual choice-of-law provisions in lending agree-
ments.6 The ability to choose in advance which law will govern an
agreement is very attractive because it affords the parties greater control
over the outcome of litigation.7 In this way, choice-of-law provisions
play an important role in the enforcement of all types of commercial
lending agreements, and in the financial success of the enterprises in-
volved in such agreements.
1. Federally insured commercial banks maintained commercial loan portfolios totalling
approximately $589.7 billion in 1987. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 492 (109th ed. 1989).
2. A business's ability to find more favorable terms, such as lower interest rates and ser-
vice charges, should increase as that business's ability to find more lenders in competition for
its business increases.
3. It appears that most businesses prefer to borrow from financial institutions near their
bases of operations; however, in major commercial transactions, the opportunity to save large
financing costs is often worth the trade-off of less personalized financial services. Conversely,
lenders who are seeking to maximize the rates of return on their assets are often willing to
accept potentially greater risks and increased transaction costs which may be associated with
out-of-state borrowers.
4. See P. MUELLER, PERSPECTIVE ON CREDIT RISK 13 (1988).
5. See Horowitz, The Law of Choice in California-A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV.
719, 765 (1974).
6. See Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: .A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-Law Prob-
lem, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 471 (1989).
7. Id.
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By their nature, contractual choice-of-law provisions are intended
to prevent litigation of conflicts-of-law questions.' However, despite the
purpose of such provisions, litigation in California and elsewhere has fre-
quently arisen with regard to the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses.9
As a result, courts have been faced with the task of determining when the
provisions should be honored and when they should be disregarded. In
attempting to resolve this issue, many courts have looked to modem
choice-of-law theories for guidance. 10 Unfortunately, most of the mod-
em theories have been formulated to apply in the absence of choice-of-
law provisions and are based on factors independent of the interests of
the parties involved in litigation.11 Since choice-of-law provisions are
used preemptively by parties to expressly determine which state's laws
should apply to their contracts, the use of most modem choice-of-law
theories in the presence of choice-of-law provisions is inappropriate.12
Dissatisfaction with the use of the modem choice-of-law theories
has led commentators to propose various alternative approaches to deter-
mine when contractual choice-of-law provisions should be honored. 3
8. See Horowitz, supra note 5, at 765.
9. Mencor Enters., Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 235 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1987); Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976);
Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811
(1971). New York state and federal courts have adjudicated a substantial number of disputes
arising from the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions. See Triad Fin. Establishment v.
Tumpane Co., 611 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); S. Leo Harmonay, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co.,
597 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985); Keystone Leasing
Corp. v. Peoples Protective Life Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); LaBeach v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 461 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Southern Int'l Sales Co. v. Potter &
Brumfield Div. of AMF, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d
554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961). For a more detailed discussion of the California
cases, see infra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
10. See, ag., North Am. Bank, Ltd. v. Schulman, 123 Misc. 2d 516, 521, 474 N.Y.S.2d
383, 387 (1984) (court struck down parties' choice of Israeli law, stating, "all objective criteria
point to the conclusion that New York... bears the greatest 'governmental interest,' or most
'substantial relationship' to this loan agreement"). See infra note 34 for a limited discussion of
the modem theories.
11. Friedler, supra note 6, at 472. Of the three most popular modem theories, none gives
the parties' interests serious consideration: "Governmental interest" analysis focuses on the
interests of the states involved; the "most significant relationship" approach focuses on the
contacts of the parties or the transactions with the forum; and the "better rule of law" ap-
proach attempts to do what is best in terms of justice in any particular case. Id.
12. Choice-of-law provisions are expressly intended to take the issue of the governing law
out of the hands of the courts. Therefore, any modem theory attempting to designate which
law should apply to a particular contract containing a choice-of-law provision should be effec-
tively foreclosed.
13. See, eg., Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts: A
Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, Part 1, 58 CORNELL
L. REV. 433, 497-501 (1973).
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One theory widely espoused is the autonomy rule. 4 The autonomy rule,
with limited exceptions, 5 requires courts to honor contractual choice-of-
law provisions as agreed upon by the parties to a transaction. 16 The au-
tonomy rule is the best rule for interpreting choice-of-law provisions be-
cause it truly upholds the expressed expectations of contracting parties.
In this manner, the autonomy rule creates a climate of certainty for par-
ties engaged in contractual relationships by eliminating unexpected sur-
prise in the interpretation of those contracts. Thus, absent fraud, duress,
or any other type of overreaching behavior, the autonomy rule is the only
rule which should govern choice-of-law provisions in commercial lend-
ing agreements.
Unfortunately, choice-of-law doctrine in California sometimes re-
futes the autonomy rule and nullifies parties' contractual choice of law.
17
This creates much uncertainty 8 without justification. Parties may avoid
this problem by incorporating consent-to-jurisdiction and mandatory
choice-of-venue provisions into their agreements, thereby allowing the
parties to litigate in states which will honor their choice of law in the
event that a dispute arises between them.
This Comment examines the California courts' treatment of choice-
14. Friedler, supra note 6, at 471. For an overview of the historical development of the
autonomy rule, see Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflicts of Laws, 30
YALE L.J. 565 (1921).
15. Fraud and duress are two obvious reasons that courts would not honor choice-of-law
provisions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment b (1971). Sec-
tion 187 of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws sets forth two other exceptions:
(1) a transaction must have a substantial relationship with the state chosen by the parties in
order for a contractual choice-of-law provision to be enforceable; and, (2) enforcement of such
provisions does not render the contract in which the provision is contained invalid due to a
fundamental public policy of the forum state. Id. § 187; see also infra notes 94-142 and accom-
panying text.
16. See generally Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of
Law: Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1659 (1982).
17. See Frame, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 673-74, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 815 (choice-of-law provision
designating New York law as controlling forfeiture agreement in employment contract struck
down as against California public policy). For a more detailed discussion of Frame, see infra
notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 143-63.
19. Choice-of-venue and consent-to-jurisdiction provisions are used in contracts in much
the same manner as choice-of-law provisions. Each provides parties greater control over dis-
putes arising from contractual agreements. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1971) (elimination of uncertainties by agreeing in advance on forum held an
indispensable element in contracting); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,
315-16 (1964) (parties to contract may agree in advance to submit to jurisdiction of particular
court). Choice-of-venue and consent-to-jurisdiction clauses provide greater control by grant-
ing parties certainty to the situs of litigation. For a detailed discussion of such provisions, see
infra notes 166-210 and accompanying text.
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of-law provisions in commercial lending agreements and critically evalu-
ates the inconsistencies evident in the interpretations of those provisions.
Part Two of the Comment discusses the uncertainty created by the Cali-
fornia courts' apparent reluctance to unequivocally honor parties'
choice-of-law provisions in commercial lending agreements and assesses
the potential costs of that uncertainty. Part Three provides a brief over-
view of the theory of governmental interest analysis,20 and its influence
on the California courts regarding general conflicts questions.
Part Four of the Comment begins by examining the influence of
governmental interest analysis on the interpretation of choice-of-law pro-
visions. It then discusses the merits of an autonomical approach to con-
tractual choice-of-law provisions and the emergence of the Restatement
(Second) as the leading influence in that area of the law today. The Com-
ment critically examines the exceptions to the Restatement's professed
endorsement of party autonomy and how those exceptions have provided
the courts wide latititude to invalidate parties' choice of law. Next, the
Comment surveys the California courts' use of the Restatement, and dis-
cusses why, from the standpoint of party autonomy, this use is counter-
productive in the context of commercial lending litigation. Part Four
then proposes a method for drafting commercial lending agreements that
should compell the California courts to honor parties choice of law in
such agreements. Finally, Part Four addresses how the doctrine of un-
conscionability affects the proposed solution.
Part Five of the Comment examines how to implement the solution
in a manner which should guarantee that parties' choice of law in com-
mercial lending agreements will be honored. Lastly, the Comment pro-
vides the reader with sample provisions which illustrate the solution
proposed.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: A LACK OF CERTAINTY IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL LENDING AGREEMENTS
IN CALIFORNIA
For years, the California courts have appeared reluctant to empha-
size party autonomy in the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions in
commercial lending agreements."1 The inconsistent approaches the
20. See infra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
21. See Mencor Enters., Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 235 Cal. Rptr.
464 (1987) (court invalidates parties' choice of Colorado law in lending agreement as against
public policy under California usury laws, despite legality under Colorado usury law); Gamer
v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976) (court upholds
parties' choice of California law in lending agreement, but qualifies circumstances under which
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courts have taken in interpreting such provisions and the manner in
which the courts have implemented those approaches illustrate this re-
luctance.22 Consequently, the courts' decisions have created a climate of
uncertainty as to whether choice-of-law provisions will be enforced, a
result which is both unnecessary and potentially dangerous.23
A lender's ability to gauge risk is an essential element in determining
its future financial success.24 The more certain a lender is that it will be
able to enforce a financing agreement as bargained for, the more accu-
rately the lender can gauge the risk of lending to particular parties. 25
The ability to gauge risk allows lenders to set interest rates in a competi-
tive, yet profitable manner.26 The greater the risk a lender believes a
customer presents, the higher the rate the lender will charge that cus-
tomer.27 Conversely, the lower the risk that the lender perceives, the
lower the rate the lender will charge.28 Consequently, lenders who feel
that they will be able to enforce agreements may be more willing to take
on risks that would otherwise be prohibitive, since risk is reduced
through the certainty of enforcement.29
When lenders loan money and are unable to collect as expected, sev-
eral consequences may arise. First, lenders may have to reassess their
risks, adding in the element of uncertainty that exists because their agree-
ments may not be enforced under the chosen law. The result could be a
refusal by certain lenders to deal with parties who are not as financially
secure as those lenders' prime customers.3" When this occurs, marginal
businesses which rely on working-capital financing to fund their day-to-
parties' choices will be honored as per Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws); Frame
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971)
(parties' choice of New York law to govern forfeiture agreement struck down by court as
against public policy). See infra notes 143-62 and accompanying text for a more detailed dis-
cussion of the California courts recent treatment of choice-of-law provisions in lending
agreements.
22. See Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964)
(utilizing "governmental interest" approach to choice-of-law provision); but see Gamer, 65
Cal. App. 3d at 287-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35 (adopting approach of Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws).
23. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
24. E. COMPTON, INSIDE COMMERCIAL BANKING 101 (2d ed. 1983); see also D. AUSTIN,
D. HAKALA & T. SCAMPINI, MODERN BANKING 194 (1985).
25. E. COMPTON, supra note 24, at 101-03.
26. Id. at 104.
27. COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS FINANCING OF THE SECTION OF COR-
PORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TERM LOAN
HANDBOOK 4 (J. McCann ed. 1983).
28. Id.
29. E. COMPTON, supra note 24, at 101-02.
30. Id. at 97.
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day operations may find themselves unable to find needed funds at af-
fordable prices, and they could fail." Ultimately, not only would the
owners, employees, and customers of those businesses suffer, but so
would their other creditors. The inability to collect those funds could
create even higher financing costs for surviving businesses, and possibly
greater hardship. In the worst case, it could result in insolvency for lend-
ers.32 As we have seen recently with regard to the savings and loan in-
dustry, lenders' financial failure affects not only the businesses which rely
on the lenders, but also the tax-paying public and the innocent investor.33
Thus, the uncertainty created by an inability to enforce lending agree-
ments under the law chosen by the parties could adversely affect all of us.
III. BACKGROUND
State sovereignty, rather than party autonomy, has for many years
provided the basis for modem choice-of-law theory.34 As such, it has
31. Id. at 99.
32. Between 1985 and 1988, 638 commercial banks with assets totalling $52.4 billion failed
in the United States. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 16
(1989). The largest number of failures occurred in 1988 when 200 banks with assets totalling
$35.7 billion failed. Id. Additionally, of the 13,114 FDIC-insured commercial banks at year-
end, 1988, 1,823 reported losses for the year. Id. at 55 (Auditor's Report). The record number
of failures in 1988 is attributed mainly to an inability of commercial banks to accurately gauge
risks in making loans to agricultural and energy concerns, and to "less developed countries."
Id (Auditor's Report). While a certain degree of risk is inherent in all lending arrangements,
the large number of recent failures in the commercial banking industry is tangible proof of the
extensive need for as much certainty as can practically be obtained in any lending transaction.
33. See Redburn, S & L Bailout 'Triumph' Is Fast Becoming a Mess, L.A. Times, Feb. 16,
1990, at Dl, col. 2; Keating Predicts S & L Bailout Will Cost $500 Billion, L.A. Times, Jan. 15,
1990, at D2, col. 2; Rosenblatt, Up to $100 Billion Extra Sought for S & L Rescues, L.A.
Times, Nov. 1, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
34. See Friedler, supra note 6, at 486-88. There are three main theories followed by a
majority of the court. Id They are "governmental interest" analysis, the "most significant
relationship" approach, and the "better rule of law" approach. Id. See infra notes 36-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of governmental interest analysis.
The "most significant relationship" approach to contractual conflicts questions in the ab-
sence of choice-of-law provisions has been defined in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict
of Laws. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). The Restatement
approach involves a two-step methodology under which courts make a quantitative and then
qualitative assessment of competing states' laws to determine which state has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the case and whose laws should therefore apply. Id. The quantitative step
involves examination of the general "rule" for a particular issue, to determine which states
have any interest in applying their laws. Id. This step of the approach really involves nothing
more than counting contacts. Section 188 of the Restatement asks the courts to consider place
of contracting, place of negotiation, place of performance, location of the subject matter of the
contract, and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business
of each party to the contract to determine which states have an interest in applying their laws.
Id. § 188(2). The Restatement then directs the courts to make a qualitative assessment of each
interested states' contacts to determine which law should be used. Id. This is done by the
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also provided the rationale by which most state courts have justified their
opinions regarding choice-of-law provisions in contractual agreements.
35
This section of the Comment provides a basic explanation of the "gov-
ernmental interest" approach to general conflict-of-law problems: con-
flicts that arise in the absence of a choice of law by the parties to a
contract, or in cases involving torts. This section emphasizes the govern-
mental interest approach's strong focus on state sovereignty, and how the
approach has influenced the California courts in determining the manner
in which to remedy general conflicts problems.
A. The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law
Governmental interest analysis, the most influential of modern
choice-of-law theories,36 was first proposed by Professor Brainerd Currie
in the late 1950s,37 and has since been refined to a great extent by modern
case law.3" In theory, governmental interest analysis is based on the
incorporation of a reference to section 6 of the Restatement in the general rule of section 188.
Id.
Section 6 presents a list of policy considerations which express the philosophic orientation
of the Restatement. Id § 6. Section 6 instructs courts to consider the needs of the interstate
and international systems, the relevant polices of other interested states including their inter-
ests in having their law applied to a particular issue, the protection of party expectations, the
basic policies underlying the particular field of law, the objectives of certainty, predictability,
and uniformity of result, and the ease of determining and applying the law previously identified
as applicable. Id
The "better rule of law" approach to conflicts is based on Professor Leflar's choice-influ-
encing considerations and attempts to "do justice in the individual case." See Friedler, supra
note 6, at 487. The five choice-influencing considerations are: (I) predictability of results; (2)
maintenance of interestate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4)
advancement of theforum's governmental interest; and, (5) application of the better rule of law.
See Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. Rav.
1584, 1586-88 (1966) (emphasis added). One of the first cases to apply this approach was
Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
35. See Horowitz, supra note 5, at 765.
36. Friedler, supra note 6, at 486.
37. Id.
38. See generally Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 1 (1984). Governmental interest arose mainly as a response to the traditional
"vested rights" approach to conflicts problems. Id Under vested rights, the forum was
obliged to apply the law of the state where the right originally vested. Id. In torts, the right
vested at the place of the wrong; in contracts, the right vested at the place where the contract
was "made." Id. As Professor Beale stated of the vested rights approach, "A right having
been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere.
Thus an act valid where done cannot be called in question anywhere." J.H. BEALE, 3 CASES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 517 (1901).
The main objection to the vested-rights approach was that the territorial orientation of the
theory assigned greater weight to foreign than to local law, in effect giving the foreign law
extraterritorial force over local law which was the source of the court's authority. E. SCOLEs
& P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 14 (1982). Under vested rights, the forum court was often
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premise that states have a fundamental interest in promoting the policies
underlying their laws by applying them to local, and in appropriate situa-
tions, interstate transactions.39 Determining the extent of a state's inter-
est in a particular case depends upon the policy underlying the law and
the reasonableness of applying that policy in the given case.4°
When a conflict between the laws of different states arises under the
governmental interest approach, the forum court examines the substance
of its relevant laws and those of the other involved states to ascertain the
underlying policies behind those laws.41 Once such policies are defined,
the forum court determines which states have an interest in the applica-
tion of their laws to a specific issue.' Under Currie's approach, four
possible situtations exist in which governmental interest analysis can be
applied.
The first situation arising under Currie's approach is the "true con-
flict," where two or more states have competing policies underlying their
laws which create an interest in having those laws applied.43 When a
true conflict arises, governmental interest analysis directs the forum to
simply apply its own law.' In that manner, the forum can avoid making
a subjective decision as to which states' policies are most deserving of
advancement, thereby serving the interests of federalism while solving
the choice-of-law conflict.
The second situation arising under Currie's approach is the so-called
placed in the position of denying its own governmental interest in applying its own law to a
case without advancing the governmental interests of the state whose law was applied. Id.
California's approach to general conflicts questions, called "comparative impairment,"
provides a good example of the manner in which the traditional governmental interest ap-
proach has been refined by modern case law. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d. 313,
546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976); see also Horowitz, supra note 5 at 748-58; see also
infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory of comparative
impairment.
39. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 38, at 17 (1982). In Currie's view:
Every state... has a governmental interest in effecutating the policies underlying its
own laws. Thus, when asked to apply the law of another forum, a court should first
inquire into the.., circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states to
assert an interest in the application of these policies.
Id. (citing B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 69 (1963)).
40. Id
41. Id
42. Id.
43. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-87 (1963).
44. Id
45. Currie asserted that forum law always applies in a true conflict situation because "as-
sessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states,
in order to determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order," and
noted further that "[t]his is a function which should not be committed to courts in a democ-
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"false conflict."' 46 False conflicts arise when two or more states appear to
have conflicting laws, but upon closer examination of the policies under-
lying those laws, the forum is able to determine that only one of the
states has a true governmental interest. 7 According to Currie, when a
false conflict arises, the forum should apply the law of the only interested
state.4" The identification of false conflicts proved to be one of the most
attractive features of Currie's interest analysis, because through subtle
manipulation of the interpretation of a state's interest or policy, courts
were able to avoid finding conflicts and could thereby settle cases in a
seemingly amicable manner.49
The third situation arising under Currie's approach involves cases in
which no state has an underlying policy which creates a legitimate inter-
est in the application of its laws.5 0 Currie called this situation the "un-
racy." Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171,
176.
Miliken v. Pratt presents a classic example of Currie's "true" conflict. 125 Mass. 374
(1878). At the time Miliken was decided, Massachusetts' law prohibited married women dom-
iciled in Massachusetts from entering into contracts guaranteeing the debts of their husbands.
Id. at 376-77. The underlying policy of the law was to protect Massachusetts' married women,
whom the state did not feel had the proper capacity to contract. Id. at 382. Mrs. Pratt, a
Massachusetts' domiciliary, entered into a contract in Maine, guaranteeing the debt of her
husband. Id at 376. Under the laws of Maine, married women could contract to guarantee
the debt of their husbands. Id. The policy behind the Maine law was to protect freedom of
contract and to encourage commerce. Id. at 382. Mr. Pratt failed to pay the Maine creditor,
Miliken, who sued Mrs. Pratt for the enforcement of her guarantee in Massachusetts state
court. Id. at 375. A true conflict existed between Massachusetts' policy of protecting married
women and the Maine's policy regarding freedom of contract. Accordingly, Currie would
have simply applied the law of the forum, Massachusetts, and voided the guarantee given by
Mrs. Pratt on behalf of her husband.
The court in Miliken used the vested rights approach to settle the conflict; the governmen-
tal interest approach had yet to be proposed by Currie. However, the case represents an excel-
lent example of a true conflict.
46. B. CURRIE, supra note 43, at 183-87.
47. W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICTS OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 478 (8th
ed. 1984).
48. Id. A good example of such a case was Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The case involved the forum's refusal to apply a foreign
guest statute to an auto accident between domicilaries of the forum in the foreign state. Id. at
477, 191 N.E.2d at 280-81, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46. The foreign state was said to have no
interest in the application of its law, which prohibited recovery for the foreign domicilaries; the
forum state was said to have an interest in providing recovery, based on the forum's policy of
providing compensation for tort victims. Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
49. W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 47, at 478. When confronted by a true con-
flict, Currie advised the forum to reconsider its interests and the interests of the other compet-
ing states to determine if a more "restrained and moderate" interpretation of the conflicting
interests would allow the forum to avoid the conflict by applying a common policy of both
states. Id.
50. B. CURRIE, supra note 43, at 183-87.
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provided-for" case."' For lack of a better solution, Currie advised that
the forum should simply apply its own law in unprovided-for cases.5 2
The last situation addressed by governmental interest analysis arises
when the forum state has no interest in applying its own law, but a con-
flict exists between the laws of two or more other states.5 3 In this situa-
tion, Currie again recommended that the forum should apply its own
law. 4 Thus, under governmental interest analysis, the law of the forum
is never displaced by the law of another state where the court determines
that its policies would be advanced by applying its own laws. 5
Although most courts today do not use the theory as it was origi-
nally set forth by Currie, 6 governmental interest analysis has nonethe-
less remained the banner by which many states wave their respective
choice-of-law flags. 7 As such, its tremendous emphasis on state sover-
eignty has been felt in all areas of choice-of-law theory, including those
dealing with contractual choice-of-law provisions.58
B. California and Governmental Interest Analysis
The California approach to general conflicts of law questions,
known as "comparative impairment," is an extension of Currie's govern-
mental interest analysis. 9 Like governmental interest analysis, compara-
tive impairment looks to the policies underlying the laws of the
competing states to establish whether or not those states have interests in
the application of their laws to a particular issue.' However, the major
difference between comparative impairment and governmental interest
analysis is the manner in which comparative impairment solves the prob-
lem of true conflicts.61
When two or more states have legitimate interests in the application
of their laws, comparative impairment, unlike governmental interest,
51. Id.
52. Id
53. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development on Conflicts of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1233, 1242-43 (1963).
54. Id.
55. E. SCOLES & P. HAy, supra note 38, at 19.
56. Juenger, supra note 38, at 1.
57. See Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1080, 1086 (1981).
58. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
59. Horowitz, supra note 5, at 748-58.
60. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320, 546 P.2d 719, 723, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215, 219 (1976).
61. For a discussion of Currie's approach to true conflicts, see supra notes 43-45 and ac-
companying text.
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does not automatically apply the law of the forum.62 Rather, compara-
tive impairment directs the forum court to evaluate the interests of the
competing states involved in the conflict and determine which state's un-
derlying policies would be most impaired if its law were not applied.63
Comparative impairment then applies the law of that state." The ration-
ale behind comparative impairment may be seen as an attempt by the
forum to best serve the needs of federalism by finding the alternative
which does the least damage to the states whose laws are competing for
application.61 Thus, as with governmental interest analysis, state sover-
eignty is a primary concern in the manner in which comparative impair-
ment settles conflicts between the laws of differing states.
IV. ANALYSIS: PARTIES' CHOICE-OF-LAW PROvIsIONS
A. Governmental Interest Analysis Applied to Parties' Choice of Law
As with their treatment of general conflicts of law problems, the
California courts have traditionally been influenced by governmental in-
terest analysis in determining the validity of choice-of-law provisions
within the framework of contractual agreements.66 One of the first ex-
amples of the treatment of a choice-of-law provision in a commercial
lending agreement in California commercial litigation is Ury v. Jewelers
Acceptance Corp.67 Ury, decided in 1964, involved the enforcement of a
lending agreement between a California jewelry retailer and a New York
62. Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id., 546 P.2d at 723-24, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20. As the California Supreme Court
stated in Bernhard:
"An attempted balancing of conflicting state policies... is difficult to justify in the
context of a federal system in which.., states are empowered to mold their policies
as they wish .... [The process] can accurately be described as... an accomodation
of conflicting state policies, as a problem of allocating domains of law-making power
in multi-state contexts ...."
Id. (quoting Horowitz, The Law of Choice in California-A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV.
719, 753 (1974).
66. See Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 289, 135 Cal. Rptr.
230, 234 (1976) ("[S]tatements of plaintiff do not create an issue of fact as to the substantial
relationship between the contract and the State of New York."); Frame v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 673, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (1971) (applica-
tion of New York law would not be foreclosed if New York had "substantial contacts with the
transactions and the parties... "); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 15,
38 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1964) (quoting trial court, "'California does not have such significant
relationships with the transaction that its governmental interest required application of its own
... laws rather than the significantly different.., laws of New York.'" (citation omitted)).
67. 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1337
commercial credit corporation .6  The agreement contained a choice-of-
law provision designating New York law as controlling if a dispute arose
between the parties. 69 Under New York law, the agreement was not usu-
rious.70 However, the retailer claimed that since the interest rates
charged by the New York lender were usurious under California law, the
agreement should not be enforced by the California courts.71 The court,
holding that New York law controlled,72 relied primarily on the connec-
tion between the contract and New York, and not on the choice-of-law
provision.73 The court found that California's governmental interest was
not sufficient to require application of its own usury laws rather than the
significantly different usury laws of New York.74 It was only after the
court had determined that New York law should apply7' that it ad-
dressed the contractual choice-of-law provision.7' Even then, the court
premised its decision to honor the provision on the fact that New York
was the place the contract was both made and performed.77 In this man-
68. Id. at 13-15, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
69. Id. at 14, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
70. Id. at 17, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
71. Id. at 20, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
72. Id
73. Id. at 16, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80. The court essentially relied on the fact that the
contract was "made" in New York; the court considered the principal place of performance
for the contract as New York, since the place of repayment of the notes was New York and the
money was made available to the borrower in New York. Id. at 16-17, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
On that basis, the court held that New York usury law should apply and that the lending
agreement should be enforced. Id. at 18, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
74. Id at 15, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
75. Id. at 16-17, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
76. Id. at 18-19, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The court stated:
We need not decide, and we do not, that this provision in the contract [that the
contract be "construed" pursuant to New York law] would cause New York law to
apply if the transaction had no substantial connection with New York....
... In the case before us, the place of performance is New York and it is reason-
able to interpret the contractual provision.., as calling for application of the law of
New York in order to give additional weight to the validity of the whole agreement.
Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 18, 38 Cal. Rptr at 381. In enunciating its policy, the court stated,
But because the place of making the contract and the place of performance are the
State of New York, we apply the rule of validation of contracts, and hold that the
contractual provision amounts to a selection by the parties that the laws of New
York shall govern the contract. Parties naturally expect that the obligations of a
contract will be fulfilled.
Id
The "rule of validation" which the court in Ury invoked, describes a method of analysis
utilized in cases involving commercial transactions across state lines, in which "[t]wo states
[have] interests in having their policies prevail on the issue of the validity of the transaction-
one state's law validating and the other invalidating the transaction and in which court[s]
[have] held that the state's policy which validated the transaction would prevail." Horowitz,
supra note 5, at 760.
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ner, Ury endorsed governmental interest as the primary factor in the Cal-
ifornia courts' determination of the validity of contractual choice-of-law
provisions.
By its nature, governmental interest analysis places primary empha-
sis on the interest of a state in applying its laws and promulgating its
policies. Thus, when dealing with contractual choice-of-law provisions,
discounting the intentions of the parties is an inevitable consequence of
the governmental interest approach.7" As such, the interpretation of
contractual choice-of-law provisions under California case law at the
time of Ury reflected a policy which focused on state sovereignty rather
than party autonomy, a focus detrimental to upholding the expectations
of the parties.
B. Restatement Section 187- Responding to the Need
for Party Autonomy
The fundamental purpose of contract law is to protect the expecta-
tions of the contracting parties by making it possible for them to accu-
rately ascertain their rights and obligations.79 In multistate transactions,
the best way to protect those expectations is to allow parties to choose
the state whose laws will govern their contractual agreements.80 In this
manner, contract law can provide certainty, predictability, and uniform-
ity of result, enabling individuals and businesses to plan their affairs most
effectively."s The ability of parties to choose the laws which will govern
their transactions is known as party autonomy. 2 Today, the notion of
party autonomy in contractual choice-of-law is generally accepted by
78. According to Professor Friedler, "[a]ll current choice-of-law theories, including 'inter-
est analysis,' totally discount the parties' specific intent regarding which law should be applied
to their contract." Friedler, supra note 6, at 486 n.80.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment c (1971).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Friedler, supra note 6, at 471. The autonomy doctrine can be traced to the writings of
Dumoulin (1500-1566), one of the great French legal scholars of the 16th century. Dumoulin
believed that the will of the parties is sovereign, and relied on their express or implied inten-
tions to select the applicable law in any particular transaction. K. LIPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 12 (1981). Dumoulin's view re-
placed the then-prevalent views of the Italian scholar Bartolus (1314-1357), that the law of the
place where the contract was made (lex loci solutionis) governed consequences arising subse-
quent to its formation. See Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,
30 YALE L.J. 565, 573 (1921). According to Bartolus and his followers, the lex loci "governed
the intrinsic validity and direct effects of contracts as a matter of law, regardless of the inten-
tions of the parties." Id. Dumoulin's view was temporarily replaced by the view of
d'Argentre, advocating a theory of the territoriality of laws, but the autonomy theory was
again popularized during Pothier's time (1699-1772). Id.
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-both the courts83 and legal scholars.84 However, despite this apparent
acceptance, the only modem theory85 that deals specifically with party
83. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd. is perhaps the first case to take a definitive stand
in support of party autonomy. 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955). Several commentators have
interpreted the cases as supporting the autonomy rule. See Prebble, supra note 13, at 443, 497-
98 (1973); Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 22 (1977); Yntema, Contract and Conflict of Laws: "Autonomy"
in Choice of Law in The United States, 1 N.Y.L.F. 46, 47 (1955).
84. See Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, Part One: Validity, 59 COLUM. L.
REv. 973, 990 (1959); Friedler, supra note 6, at 473; Horowitz, supra note 5, at 765; Prebble,
supra note 13, at 503, 519; Reese, Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, 9
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 531, 536 (1960).
The primary objection to the autonomy rule, offered originally during the 1930s, was that
parties do not have the power to agree to a choice of law because by doing so they are essen-
tially taking the legislative function away from the states. See Note, supra note 16, at 1664
n.23. It was argued that since the validity of a contract is a conclusion of law, the parties may
have no effective voice in the choice of law governing validity unless there has been an actual
delegation to them of legislative power. Id This argument was set forth by Judge Learned
Hand in E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931):
People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place .... [Ain agreement
is not a contract, except as the law says it shall be, and to try and make it one is to
pull on one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation, and the parties have
nothing whatever to do with that; no more than with whether their acts are torts or
crimes.
Id at 117.
The general notion that choice-of-law provisions were a legislative act was also supported
by Professor Beale, the Reporter for the American Institute's Committee on Conflict of Laws,
Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L. REv. 260, 260 (1910). Thus,
this notion was reflected in the original Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, which does not
mention party autonomy. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). However, the modern
view rejects the idea that choice-of-law provisions usurp the legislative function since under
choice-of-law rules, the forum determines whether the parties to a contract can choose the law
that will govern their transaction. Reese, supra, at 534. Reese answered Judge Hand in no
uncertain terms, stating, "If parties are permitted to choose the law to govern the validity of
the contract, it is not because they are legislators but simply because the forum has adopted a
choice of law rule which provides that the law chosen by the parties shall be applied." Id. See
also Rheinstien, Book Review, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 478, 486 (1948).
Another, more practical view towards choice-of-law provisions was offered by then-Judge
Harlan in Siegelman:
Instead of viewing the parties as usurping the legislative function, it seems more
realistic to regard them as relieving the courts of the problem of resolving a question
of conflict of laws. Their course might be expected to reduce litigation, and is to be
commended as much as good draftsmanship which relieves courts of problems of
resolving ambiguities. To say that there may be no reduction in litigation because
courts may not honor the provision is to reason backwards. A tendency toward
certainty in commercial transactions should be encouraged by the courts.
221 F.2d at 195.
At least one commentator has argued that the question is not "whether or not the parties
inherently have the power to help shape legislative jurisdiction by private contract, or whether
a forum's conflicts rule could delegate that power to them, but rather whether it is proper as a
matter of federalism to allow the parties' intentions to shape legislative jurisdiction." Note,
supra note 16, at 1664.
85. See Friedler, supra note 6, at 488.
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autonomy in the contractual choice-of-law context is the approach of
section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws.86
The Restatement approach has been described as the "embodiment
of the autonomy principle"87 and has become the primary tool for a ma-
jority of courts in interpretating contractual choice-of-law provisions to-
day. 8 Since its inception in 1971, the Restatement has also been adopted
by the California courts as the correct approach to be used in cases inter-
preting choice of law by parties in lending and other contractual agree-
ments. 9 Unfortunately, however, the Restatement approach does not
always uphold the expectations of contracting parties, and therefore its
application is not appropriate in the context of commercial lending
litigation.
Subsection 187(1) of the Restatement provides that "[t]he law of
the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that
issue."9 Comment c of section 187 explains that the intentions of the
parties to a contract will be honored as long as they can reasonably be
construed from extrinsic evidence, such as the use of provisions of a for-
eign law, within such a contract.9 1 The comment further explains that
based on extrinsic evidence "as to all such matters, the forum will apply
the provisions of the chosen law."92 In this manner, subsection (1) im-
plies that intent is paramount in interpreting choice-of-law provisions;
however, this is true only if the parties could have resolved the conflict
with an explicit provision in the contract directed to the issue. The result
is that section 187 appears to emphasize party autonomy, even in cases
where there is an absence of an express contractual provision for choice
of law.
Subsection 187(2) is the most important subsection of section 187.
It provides that:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their con-
tractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular
issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
87. Friedler, supra note 6, at 489.
88. Id. at 488-89.
89. See, e-g., Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668,
673, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (1971) (contracting parties may specify controlling law if not
contrary to public policy).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
91. Id. comment c.
92. Id
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explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, un-
less either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the par-
ties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary
to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination
of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188,
would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties.93
On its face, subsection 187(2) appears to support party autonomy
through deference to contracting parties' expectations. It indicates that
even when parties could not have resolved a particular issue by a specific
provision in an agreement, the law of the state chosen by the parties to
govern the contract will still control unless it has no substantial relation-
ship to the parties, or the provision violates a fundamental policy of a
state with a greater interest than that chosen. However, it is the limita-
tions of the section, framed in terms of exceptions, which illustrate that
the Restatement approach is internally inconsistent and how section 187,
as interpreted by some courts, could be characterized as a limitation on
party autonomy-not unlike the choice-of-law theories section 187 im-
plicitly professes to replace.
C. Application of the Restatement Exceptions
1. A "substantial relationship"
Section 187(2)(a) sets forth the first exception to the enforcement of
choice-of-law provisons in contractual agreements.9" This exception in-
dicates that a court's ability to enforce a choice-of-law provision depends
on the existence of a substantial relationship" between the parties to a
93. Id. § 187(2) (emphasis added).
94. Id. § 187(2)(a).
95. Morris Levin was one of the first scholars to formally propose that a contract must
have a substantial connection to the state whose law is chosen to govern the contract. Levin,
Party Autonomy: Choice-of-Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEo. L.J. 260, 261
(1957). Levin's rule proposed that:
Where the parties to a commercial contract have made an express stipulation that the
law of a particular state or nation should govern the contract, and the law so stipu-
lated has a substantial connection with the transaction and its enforcement would not
be contrary to the public policy of the forum, then the forum should use the internal
(domestic) law of the particular state or nation stipulated as governing all questions
arising under the contract.
Id. (emphasis omitted). Levin's rule, which also incorporates the public policy exception,
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contract, or the contract itself, and the state whose law is designated as
controlling.96 If no such relationship exists, then the provision should
not be enforced.97
Comment f of section 187 indicates that the rationale for requiring a
substantial relationship between the state chosen and the parties or the
issue is that such a relationship provides evidence of a reasonable basis
for the parties' choice.98 However, the requirement of a substantial rela-
tionship impairs certainty in contractual relationships and therefore
should be eliminated.
appears to be a precursor to section 187 of the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.
Levin saw the requirement of a substantial connection as a "reaffirmance of the restrictive
policy against self-legislation by the parties," and as "a buttress against those who fear the use
of a strange or exotic law unconnected with the transaction." Id. at 263. See also Lorenzen,
supra note 82, at 673. Other commentators have opposed the requirement of a substantial
relationship as a qualification to the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions. See
Ehrenzweig, supra note 84, at 990. ("There is little reason... for limiting the parties' express
choice to a law having a substantial, or for that matter any, contact with the case.").
96. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971). Another reason
given for this limitation is preventing the extension of party autonomy to a purely local trans-
action. Friedler, supra note 6, at 490. The limitation has also been justified as an effort to
discourage parties from entering into contracts with the purpose of evading the laws of the
forum state. Id. See Hall v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 411, 197 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1983),
for an example of a case where the parties to a California transaction attempted to avoid
California'a corporate security law by including a choice-of-law provision designating Nevada
law as controlling their contract.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971). Comment f of
the Restatement indicates that the requirement that parties to a multistate contract have a
substantial relationship with the chosen state may be waived if there is a reasonable basis for
their choice. Id. § 187 comment f. The comment notes that:
[W]hen contracting in countries whose legal systems are strange to them as well as
relatively immature, the parties should be able to choose a law on the ground that
they know it well and that it is sufficiently developed. For only in this way can they
be sure of knowing accurately the extent of their rights and duties under the contract.
Id.
Still, many courts, particularly in New York, seem to demand some substantial relation-
ship between the transaction and the law chosen. See, eg., Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 559,
175 N.E.2d 441, 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68 (1961) (law chosen must be of jurisdiction with
"most significant contacts with the matter in dispute").
The requirement of a "reasonable" relationship between the transaction and the tate in
contractual choibe-of-law disputes has also been endorsed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
U.C.C. § 1-105 (1989). Section 1-105 states in relevant part that:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable
relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the
law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropri-
ate relation to this state.
Id. § 1-105(1).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment f (1971). The com-
ment explains that the forum will not "apply a foreign law which has been chosen by the
parties in the spirit of adventure or to provide mental exercise for the judge." Id.
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To begin with, any reason that two freely bargaining parties have for
choosing a particular state's laws to govern their contracts should pro-
vide a reasonable basis for honoring that choice.99 The relationship be-
tween the state chosen and either the parties or the contract is irrelevant
as far as it relates to upholding the expectations of parties to that con-
tract. By requiring such a relationship, the Restatement merely places
the emphasis of section 187 back on state sovereignty, while greatly limit-
ing the ability of parties to freely contract for the law to govern their
agreements. As the Restatement itself points out, the parties' choice of
law should be upheld even in cases where that choice was made to avoid
the laws of one state which may treat their transaction unfavorably. 1"
The need for certainty in contract law requires this result. Thus, the first
"exception" of the Restatement section 187 has provided the courts with
a mechanism for invalidating choice-of-law provisons, despite the wishes
of the parties who enter into the agreements.
There is another compelling reason why the California courts
should honor choice-of-law provisions in commercial litigation, regard-
less of whether a relationship between the parties or issue and the state
chosen exists. In 1986, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill
3223, modifying California's choice-of-law doctrine.101 In essence, the
statute requires the courts to honor choice-of-law provisions in commer-
cial contracts which designate California as the chosen state of law, re-
99. The only time that such a choice should not be honored is when it would automatically
invalidate a contract, thereby usurping the purpose of entering into agreements in the first
place. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e (1971) ("If parties
have chosen a law that would invalidate the contract, it can be assumed that they did so by
mistake.").
100. Id.
101. Act of Sept. 20, 1986, ch. 968, 1986 Cal. Stat. 3346, 3346-47 (codified as amended as
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 1990)). This section provides in pertinent part:
The parties to any contract, agreement, or undertaking, contingent or otherwise,
relating to a transaction involving in the aggregate not less than two hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000), . . . may agree that the law of this state shall govern
their rights and duties in whole or in part, whether or not the contract, agreement, or
undertaking or transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state. This section does
not apply to any contract, agreement, or undertaking (a) for labor or personal serv-
ices, (b) relating to any transaction primarily for personal, family, or household pur-
poses ....
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or deny the enforcement of
any provision respecting choice of law in any contract, agreement, or undertaking to
which this section does not apply.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). The same statute that pro-
vided for this amendment also amended Chapter 1 of Title 5 of Part 2 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure regarding choice of forum and forum non conveniens. See Act of Sept. 20,
1986, ch. 968, Cal. Stat. 3346, 3347-48 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 410.30-.40 (West Supp. 1990)).
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gardless of whether the agreement or the parties to the agreement have any
relationship to the state whatsoever."0 2 The purpose of the statute is to
promote California as a leading commercial and financial center by al-
lowing businesses to settle disputes under California law regardless of
their connection to the state.
10 3
The importance of this legislative action cannot be overstated. It
directly supports the autonomy principle in contractual choice-of-law,
and at the same time, unquestionably refutes the California judicial sys-
tem's endorsement of section 187 of the Restatement (Second)."° Con-
sequently, California courts that continue to require a substantial
connection with the chosen state before enforcing choice-of-law provi-
sions directly contradict the express intent of the state legislature. The
invalidity of such a position is self-evident.
Finally, based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in All-
state Insurance Co. v. Hague,10 there is no constitutional basis for re-
quiring a substantial relationship between the parties or the issue and the
chosen state. 10 6 In Allstate, the Court enunciated its constitutional re-
quirements with regard to choice of law. In doing so, the Court contin-
ued its previous expansion of the states' power to decide choice-of-law
issues.'07 A four-member plurality of the Court held that "for a State's
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 1990).
103. At the hearing on Assembly Bill 3223, the California Assembly Committee on the
Judiciary stated:
According to the source of this bill, Richard Mosk, a private attorney and arbitrator,
the bill is modeled after a similar statute enacted in New York in 1984 for the pur-
pose of fostering New York as an international arbitration center. The sponsor be-
lieves this bill would accomplish the same result for California. The bill would
enable foreign businesses entering a commercial contract to designate California and
the laws of California, a neutral forum, to govern any contract disputes that arise.
Hearing on AB 3223, Assembly Committee on Judiciary, March 31, 1986.
104. See, eg., Mencor Enters., Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 438, 235
Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (1987) (" 'parties, generally speaking, have power to determine the terms
of their contractual engagements' ") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187 (1971)).
105. 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
106. See infra note 110.
107. Note, supra note 16, at 1663. ("Allstate... confirmed and extended the subsequent
trend in Supreme Court decisions widening the area of freedom that states enjoy in deciding
choice-of-law issues."). Home Insurance Co. v. Dick was one of the first cases to deal with the
constitutional limitations of choice of law. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In Dick, the United States
Supreme Court announced that the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause may be used
to prevent a forum state from unreasonably applying its own law in conflicts disputes. Id. at
411. The case involved a conflict between the use of Mexican and Texan law. Id. at 404-05.
The forum was Texas, but the only true contact between the case and the state was the fact
that the suit was being litigated in Texas (jurisdiction was provided in rem through garnish-
ment). Idt at 408. The Supreme Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court, holding that the
Due Process Clause precluded application of Texas law. Id. at 411-12. The Court's rationale
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substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner,
that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 10 8 However, the plurality struggled
to find the requisite aggregation of contacts that would create a sufficient
state interest so that the forum could apply its own law. 109 In that man-
ner, the Court's holding created the now-prevalent view among commen-
tators that there are no true constitutional limitations on choice of
law. " 0 Consequently, the practical result of the decision appears to be
was that the parties had expressly agreed to be bound by Mexico's law and that "Texas law
may not validly affect contracts which are neither made nor are to be performed in Texas,"
thus implying that application of Texas law would have been fundamentally unfair. Id. at 410.
In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, the Court
addressed whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause of article IV, section 1 of the United States
Constitution could restrict the application of a forum's own law by requiring the forum to
apply the law of another state. 294 U.S. 532, 539 (1935). Petitioner in the case sought to limit
damages to an injured worker through the application of Alaska's workmen's compensation
laws. Id. The petitioner argued that since the injury took place in Alaska, California was
required to give "full faith and credit" to that state's law, despite the fact that the worker had
originally contracted to work in Alaska under an agreement made in California. Id. Justice
Stone, writing for the Court, stated:
[Tihe conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and
credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to
those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction,
and turning the scale of decision according to their weight.
Id. at 547.
In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission, another workmen's
compensation case, the Court discarded the Alaska Packers balancing test and held that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause only required the forum to have some interest in the application
of its laws. 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939). The Court thus further removed full faith and credit as a
vehicle for compelling a state to apply another state's laws.
108. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312-13 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 313. Although he worked in Minnesota, the decedent in the case had resided,
obtained insurance, and had been killed in Wisconsin. Id. at 305-06. His widow moved to
Minnesota after his death and filed in Minnesota state court. Id. at 305. Minnesota law
allowed the plaintiff to recover under multiple uninsured motorist policies. Id. at 305-06.
Under Wisconsin law, such stacking of the policies for recovery was not allowed. Id. at 306.
110. See Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: A Dismal
Prospect, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 907, 915-16 (1981); Von Mehren & Trautman, Constitutional
Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 38 (1981);
Weintraub, Who'r Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law?, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 17, 34 (1981).
Significant in the Supreme Court's decision in Allstate was the manner in which the Court
merged the due process and full faith and credit analyses used in considering constitutional
limitations on choice-of-law issues. In its opinion, the Court made clear that it no longer
distinguishes between the two types of constitutional violations in regard to choice-of-law
questions. The Court stated:
This Court has taken a similar approach in deciding choice-of-law cases under both
the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In each instance, the
Court has examined the relevant contacts and resulting interests of the State whose
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that as long as there is any contact with a chosen state sufficient to create
a state interest, the Court will allow application of that state's law, even if
another state has a materially greater interest. Thus, in applying the All-
state test, it appears that parties' choice of law would be a sufficient con-
tact to create a state interest which would justify application of that law
under constitutional standards.'11 The California Legislature endorsed
this view when it removed the requirement of a substantial relationship
law was applied. Although at one time the Court required a more exacting standard
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause than under the Due Process Clause for evalu-
ating the constitutionality of choice-of-law decisions, the Court has since abandoned
the weighing-of-interests requirement.
Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308 n.10 (citations omitted) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
Even if, as Judge Hand stated, choice-of-law rules could be equated to setting the parame-
ters of the states' legislative power to affect a contractual relationship, an analogy of those rules
to the rules that determine judicial jurisdiction further illustrates that the autonomy rule does
not overstep the constitutional limitations on choice of law. E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co.,
48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931). Through International Shoe Co. v. Washington and its prog-
eny, the Supreme Court has made clear that due process, and not federalism, is the basis for
determining jurisdictional legitimacy over foreign citizens. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Court
stated in Insurance Corp. v Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied
to state courts, reflects an element of federalism-and the character of state sover-
eignty vis-a-vis other States .... The restriction on state sovereign power described
in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is
the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes
no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated
as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be
possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot
change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to
powers from which he may otherwise be protected.
456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982). Analogously, "where the parties have freely and knowingly
chosen the law of a particular state to govern their contract, it is not unfair to hold them to
their bargain." Note, supra note 16, at 1667.
The Court's emphasis on fundambntal fairness in Allstate cannot be overstated, as it
formed the basis for the rationale behind the decision. In arriving at its result, the Court stated
that there was "no element of unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations . .. ."
449 U.S. at 318 n.24 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Thus, while concerns for state sover-
eignty are certainly not to be overlooked, the Court has clearly sent a message that due process
is the test in choice of law. See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 49, at 370 ("[Allstate]
suggests that the only serious test is due process. Once due process is satisfied the full-faith
requirement fades away.").
111. Justice Stevens, concurring in Allstate, stated that a choice-of-law decision by a state
"would violate the Due Process Clause if it were totally arbitrary or if it were fundamentally
unfair to either litigant." 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens found that "[a]
choice of law decision that frustrates the justifiable expectations of the parties can be funda-
mentally unfair" and further that the "desire to prevent unfair surprise to a litigant has been
the central concern in this Court's decisions under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 327 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Thus, in a contractual choice-of-law situation, a court may be violating
the Due Process Clause by not honoring the law chosen by the parties since, as Stevens pointed
out, it may be fundamentally unfair not to honor their justified expectations.
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with the state through its passage of Assembly Bill 3223.112 In that
respect, the courts in California could seemingly resolve issues of involv-
ing parties' choice of law quite easily by simply adopting the approach of
Assembly Bill 3223-and honoring the parties' intent-regardless of the
relationship between the contract and the chosen state.
2. Public policy
Subsection 187(2)(b) of the Restatement provides a second, some-
what less easily defined mechanism through which the courts may escape
the effects of a choice-of-law provision.' 13 This subsection, known as the
"public policy" exception, 14 indicates that public policy may be used to
invalidate a contractual choice-of-law provision when the law of the cho-
sen state would be "contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has
a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of
the particular issue .... "15 Unfortunately, what constitutes a "funda-
mental policy" of a state is unclear. Comment g of section 187 explains,
"[n]o detailed statement can be made of the situations where a 'funda-
mental' policy of the state of the otherwise applicable law will be found
to exist.""' 6 The Comment continues by stating that "[t]o be 'fundamen-
tal,' a policy must in any event be a substantial one.""' Despite the
ambiguity as to what constitutes a "fundamental" public policy, the Re-
statement expresses no reservations as to the right of a state to invalidate
an otherwise appropriate choice-of-law provision. As Comment g ex-
plains, "[flulfiHment of the parties' expectations is not the only value in
contract law; regard must also be had for state interests and for state
regulation."' 18 Thus, the Restatement, in a manner which appears to
defy its stated purpose, 9 endorses state sovereignty as a primary factor
in determining the validity of choice-of-law provisions.
112. Act of Sept. 20, 1986, ch. 968, 1986 Cal. Stat. 3346, 3346-47 (codified as amended at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 1990)). See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
113. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
114. See Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1039 (4th Cir. 1983).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
116. Id. comment g.
117. Id.
118. lId
119. Ia comment e. Comment e explains the rationale of the Restatement approach: to
protect the justified expectations of parties entering into contractual agreements, by "letting
the parties choose the law to govern the validity of [their] contract[s] and the rights created
thereby." Id. The comment states further that "[g]iving parties this power of choice is also
consistent with the fact that, in contrast to other areas of the law, persons are free within broad
limits to determine the nature of their contractual obligations." Id. It would be difficult to
find a more defininitive endorsement of the doctrine of party autonomy.
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An example of a California court's reliance on the public policy ex-
ception is Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc."12 In
Frame, a California employee of Merrill Lynch sought a determination
that he did not forfeit his profit-sharing rights under his employment
contract when he resigned and took employment with a competitor of
Merrill Lynch.121 The contract designated New York law as control-
ling,122 and contained a forfeiture provision which was valid under New
York law but invalid under California law. 23 The court held that Cali-
fornia law governed on the issue of the forfeiture agreement, despite the
presence of the choice-of-law provision.124 While recognizing the par-
ties' general right to choose the law that would govern their agree-
ment, 125 the court nonetheless held that public policy foreclosed the state
from recognizing the existence of the provision.126
Despite the apparent endorsement of the public policy exception in
Frame, the difficulty in applying the exception is well noted by scholars
and jurists alike.1 27  Most of the criticism surrounds the ambiguity of
what constitutes a state's fundamental public policy and the ease with
which courts are able to invoke the exception.1 28  Perhaps the best illus-
tration of the problem is Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Products, Inc. 129
Barnes Group involved a breach of a non-competition clause in an
120. 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971).
121. Id. at 670, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
122. Id at 673, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
123. Id
124. Id at 674, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
125. Id. at 673, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The court began by announcing its recognition of the
validity of contractual choice-of-law provisions by stating that "contracting parties may by
agreement specify what law is to control their contract ... ." Id. The court, however, then
qualified this assertion based on the public policy exception, requiring the "'enforcement of
the contract by a local court in accordance with the foreign law agreed to be controlling does
not result in an evasion of the settled public policy or a statute of the forum protecting its
citizens.'" Id. (quoting trial court).
126. Id. The court said that "an agreement designating applicable law will not be given
effect if it would violate a strong California public policy." Id. Further, California's doctrine
on the forfeiture issue was found to represent a "strong public policy," which, the court held,
the choice-of-law provision would not be allowed to defeat. Id.
127. See, e.g., Barnes Group, 716 F.2d at 1039 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Murnaghan stated in Barnes Group that "the fundamental policy
exception to the general rule of § 187 [may] become 'an escape valve out of which all the
predictability and certainty of the autonomy rule [honoring contractual choices of law] flows,'
[and may, therefore] threaten to swallow the rule." Id. (Mumaghan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Con-
flicts of Law: Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1659, 1673
(1982)).
128. Friedler, supra note 6, at 495.
129. 716 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1983).
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agreement in which the parties had stipulated that Ohio law would gov-
ern their transaction. 130 The plaintiff in the case sought recovery for the
defendant's alleged tortious interference with contracts that the plaintiff
maintained with certain of its sales agents, some of whom worked in Ala-
bama."' Under Alabama law, covenants not to compete were void;
however, in Ohio, the covenants were valid.' 32 The defendant sought to
defeat the choice-of-law provision which designated the application of
Ohio law on grounds that under Alabama law covenants not to compete
were against public policy.'33 In applying section 187 of the Restatement
(Second),' the Fourth Circuit described the public policy exception as
the "most vexing element of the Restatement (Second) formulation, in
determining whether to adhere to [a] contractual choice-of-law provi-
sion. '13' The court stated further that "[i]t is apparent that there can be
no clear-cut delineation of those policies that are sufficiently 'fundamen-
tal,' within the meaning of [section] 187(2)(b), to warrant overriding a
contractual stipulation of controlling law."' 136 Nonetheless, the court
overruled the parties' choice of law by applying Alabama law and void-
ing the covenant not to compete.' 37 The majority concluded that "[t]o
honor the contractual choice of law would make enforceable a contract
flatly unenforceable in Alabama, surely impinging upon the 'fundamental
policy' of Alabama."' 38
The court, which itself invoked the public policy exception while
espousing the difficulty of its application, 139 appeared to demonstrate dis-
dain for party autonomy by overriding the parties' choice of law. More-
over, the court, in its rush to invalidate the choice-of-law provision,
130. Id. at 1028.
131. Id. at 1027.
132. Id. at 1032.
133. Id. at 1028.
134. Id. at 1029.
135. Id. at 1030.
136. Id. at 1031.
137. Id. at 1032. The court distinguished between situations in which the contractually
chosen law merely diverges slightly from that of the state whose law would otherwise apply,
and situations in which the chosen law would validate an otherwise unenforceable contract.
Id. The court stated:
[N]ot every situation where contractually chosen law diverges merely in degree from
that of the state whose law would otherwise apply impinges upon the fundamental
policy of that state .... At the other extreme, it seems apparent that where the law
chosen by the parties would make enforceable a contract flatly unenforceable in the
state whose law would otherwise apply, to honor the choice-of-law provision would
trench upon the state's "fundamental policy."
Id. at 1031.
138. Id. at 1032.
139. IAL at 1030-31.
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misapplied the requirements of section 187(2)(b) by never analyzing
whether Alabama had a materially greater interest than Ohio on the is-
sue of determining the validity of covenants not to compete. 1'4 The end
result not only failed to protect the expectations of the parties, but it also
undermined the other goals of contract law: providing certainty, predict-
ability and uniformity of results.
1 41
In this manner, Barnes Group demonstrated the inherent difficulties
in applying the fundamental policy exception: (1) that no clear-cut anal-
ysis exists to determine when a state policy is fundamental and when it is
not; and, (2) application of the exception often overrides the wishes of the
parties who enter into contractual agreements. Despite these difficulties,
however, public policy still remains the primary justification for the in-
validation of contractual choice-of-law provisions in the law today.42
D. The Creation of Uncertainty: California Relies
on the Restatement Approach
Today, the Restatement approach is the method of choice in Cali-
fornia for the interpretation of contractual choice-of-law provisions.1 4
However, because of the difficulty in applying the approach, fundamental
problems involving contract law have arisen with respect to its use, par-
ticularly in the enforcement of commercial lending agreements.
One of the first and most well-known California cases to abandon
governmental interest in favor of Restatement section 187 in the interpre-
tation of a choice-of-law provision in lending agreements is Gamer v.
duPont Glore Forgan, Inc. 1  Gamer, decided in 1976, involved the en-
forcement of a choice-of-law provision which selected New York law to
govern a contract for a margin account between an individual and his
stockbroker.' The plaintiff in Gamer complained that the provision
amounted to a waiver of his rights under the California usury laws, and
that it therefore should not have been honored by the lower California
140. The Restatement approach calls for an objective determination of the states which
have contacts with the issue, a subjective analysis of which state has the most significant rela-
tionship, and finally a determination of whether that state's fundamental policy has been vio-
lated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
141. Id § 187 comment e.
142. See Horowitz, supra note 5, at 766-67; Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another
Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV.
291, 352-53 (1988); Prebble, supra note 13, at 509-12; Note, supra note 16, at 1'674-77.
143. See, e.g., Mencor Enters. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 438-40, 235
Cal. Rptr. 464, 468-70 (1987).
144. 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976).
145. Id. at 283, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
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courts.
14 6 Despite this argument, the Gamer court upheld the parties'
choice of law. However, in doing so, the court qualified the circum-
stances under which choice-of-law provisions would be honored.147 The
court's analysis relied on the test laid out in Restatement section 187.
The court focused on both the relationship of the contract with New
York, and whether or not the public policy exception of 187(2)(b) was
applicable.148 The court dealt with the latter issue first by quoting Frame
in enunciating its attitude towards public policy:
As a general rule, it is said that contracting parties may by
agreement specify what law is to control their contract if "en-
forcement of the contract by a local court in accordance with
the foreign law agreed to be controlling does not result in an
evasion of the settled public policy or a statute of the state of
the forum protecting its citizens."
' 149
The court determined, however, that even though the rate of interest
being charged by the broker exceeded the legal rate then permitted in
California, it was permitted under the laws of New York and, on that
basis, the agreement did not offend public policy.150 Additionally, since
the defendant's principal place of business was New York, the court
found that the relationship of the contract with New York was sufficient
to warrant honoring the choice-of-law provision. 15  However, despite
upholding the provision, it is the manner in which the Gamer court ana-
lyzed the validity of the parties' choice of law which illustrates why the
Restatement approach is fundamentally inconsistent.
Rather than presuming the validity of the provision, the court in
Gamer assumed the opposite and applied the Restatement in a manner
which suggests that the exceptions of section 187(2) can more accurately
146. Id. at 285, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
147. Id. at 286-87, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
148. Id. at 287-88, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971)).
149. Id. at 287, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (quoting Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 673, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (1971)).
150. Id. at 290, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 235. In determining whether California public policy had
been offended, the court invoked section 203 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
which states:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it provides
for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the contract has a substan-
tial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the general usury
law of the. state of the otherwise applicable law under § 188.
Id at 288, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 203 (1971)).
151. Gamer, 65 Cal. App. 3d at 289, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
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be viewed as limitations.152 Rather than emphasizing the need for up-
holding the parties' expectations and focusing on the certainty that the
choice-of-law provision was intended to provide, the court instead
searched for reasons not to honor the parties' intent. 53 The practical
result of the Gamer decision is that the "exceptions" were used to swal-
low up the general rule of the Restatement whichfavors enforcement of
the parties' choice of law. 5 a In doing so, the use of the Restatement in
Gamer created an issue of even greater concern than the mere application
of the test itself.15 5
By qualifying the circumstances under which choice-of-law provi-
sions will be honored, Gamer has taken much of the certainty which is
necessary in lending relationships out of the hands of contracting parties.
Instead, contractual autonomy has been replaced with judicially created
qualifications which disfavor parties' intent and which have made it ex-
tremely difficult for businesses to plan effectively since they can never be
sure which laws may govern their contracts. As noted previously, aban-
doning party autonomy could be especially detrimental to certainty in
152. Id. at 285, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 232. The court stated the issue was whether the parties'
choice-of-law was invalid because the contract had no substantial relationship with New York,
or because the parties' choice would "do violence" to California public policy. Id.
153. Id. at 287-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
154. Friedler, supra note 6, at 490.
155. Prior to Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376
(1964), there are few examples of parties attempting to use the courts to invalidate contractual
choice-of-law provisions, and none in which a California appellate court refused to honor the
intent of the parties who stipulated their choice of law in a lending agreement. Boole v. Union
Marine Ins. Co. is perhaps the earliest example of the courts' treatment of such provisions, and
established the view that the courts in California are bound by the parties' choice of law. 52
Cal. App. 207, 198 P. 416 (1921). Boole involved a marine insurance policy. Id. at 208, 198 P.
at 416. The issue in the case centered around whether a constructive total loss of a ship had
occured. Id. at 210-11, 198 P. at 417. California and English law differed on the question;
however, the majority in Boole enforced a provision in the policy that all claims for loss under
the policy were to be adjusted according to English law. Id. The court held that
the parties... may agree to be bound by the law of a foreign jurisdiction ... , and
may stipulate that the policy shall be construed and governed by the laws, usages,
and customs of a foreign state, and such laws, usages, and customs of a foreign state
as are applicable shall be deemed to be a part of the written contract.
Id. at 209-10, 198 P. at 417. The issue in Boole did not involve validation of a party's promise
as it had in Ury, 227 Cal. App. 2d at 15, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 379, and Gamer, 65 Cal. App. 3d at
283, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 231, but rather dealt with the interpretation of a term in an insurance
policy. Boole, 52 Cal. App. at 208, 198 P. at 416. Nonetheless, it was that interpretation
which was dispositive as to the outcome of the case, and therefore the Boole holding can be
seen as supporting the general principle of autonomy in choice of law in California. See also
People v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 96 Cal. App. 2d 571, 573, 216 P.2d 64, 65-66 (1950)
(contractual provision that insurance policy was "[w]arranted to be subject to English law and
usage as to liability for and settlement of any and all claims" given effect in determining com-
putation of particular average loss).
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the enforcement of commercial lending arrangements.'- 6 Another more
recent California case illustrates this point well.
In Mencor Enterprises, Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp.,5 7 a California
borrower sued a Colorado lender for treble the amount of interest paid
by the borrower on a promissory note. 5 8 The trial court sustained the
lender's demurrer to the complaint for usury without leave to amend,
holding as a matter of law that the Colorado interest rate selected by the
parties did not constitute usury entitling the California borrower to sue
for damages under California usury law.' 59 The Court of Appeal re-
versed.160 The appellate court held that the trial court committed revers-
ible error in failing to examine "the reasonable relationship of the
contract to Colorado, the substantial contacts of the parties with Colo-
rado and consideration of California's fundamental policy with respect to
usury.
16 1
Mencor Enterprises represents the culmination of the California
courts' recent interpretations of Restatement section 187.162 Unfortu-
nately, the case also stands for the notion that party autonomy is not the
primary consideration in interpreting choice-of-law provisions in con-
tractual agreements in California. Part of the reason for this may rest
with the apparently inconsistent approach of the Restatement itself.1
63
However, regardless of where the fault lies, parties entering into commer-
cial lending agreements which are later litigated in California cannot be
certain that the law of the state they have chosen to govern their agree-
ments will be applied. For these reasons, this Comment proposes a man-
ner in which choice-of-law provisions in commercial lending agreements
may be drafted so as to force the California courts to honor the intent of
the parties involved.
E. Resolution of the Problem
Given the California courts' endorsement of section 187 of the Re-
statement" and the inherent uncertainty that the Restatement approach.
156. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
157. 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 235 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1987).
158. Id. at 434, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 441, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
161. Id.
162. The Mencor Enterprises court relied on both Gamer and Ury in its decision. 190 Cal.
App. 3d at 440, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70 (citing Garner v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal.
App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d
11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964)).
163. See supra notes 55-104 and accompanying text.
164. See Mencor Enters., Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 438, 235 Cal.
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fosters, 165 parties to commercial lending litigation in California have only
one option to assure that their choice of law will be honored: move the
litigation out of California to a court of the state designated by the par-
ties in their agreement. Only in this manner can the parties assure that
the California courts will not abrogate their intent by refusing to enforce
choice-of-law provisions in those agreements. Removal of the litigation
from California to a court of the parties' choosing can easily be accom-
plished by adding two provisions to lending agreements, in addition to the
parties' choice of law. The first is a mandatory choice-of-forum provi-
sion; the second, consent to jurisdiction by the parties to the chosen state.
This part of the Comment exarlines the endorsement of contractual
choice-of-forum and consent-to-jurisdiction clauses by the United States
Supreme Court and by the California courts. The Comment then exam-
ines recent case law which distinguishes between parties' mandatory and
permissive contractual forum selection. The section concludes that par-
ties to commercial lending litigation in California can choose to litigate
in a state outside of California that will honor their choice of law, but to
make a specific choice of forum effective, the parties must specify the
chosen venue with mandatory language which coincides with both par-
ties' consent-to-jurisdiction.
1. Choice-of-forum provisions
In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,1 66 the United States
Supreme Court endorsed the validity of choice-of-forum provisions by
stating unequivocally that "such clauses are prima facie valid and should
be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'un-
reasonable' under the circumstances."16 7 The Court held that the burden
of proving that the forum selected by the contracting parties was unrea-
sonable rested on the resisting party to demonstrate evidence of fraud,
duress, or other overreaching behavior in the formation of the con-
tract. 168 In its decision, the Court explained its rationale, stating that
"[tihere are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated private... agree-
ment, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power.., should be given full effect.... The elimination of... uncer-
tainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is
Rptr. 464, 468 (1987); Garner v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 288, 135
Cal. Rptr. 230, 234 (1976).
165. See supra notes 143-63 and accompanying text.
166. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
167. Id. at 10.
168. Id. at 15.
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an indispensable element in... trade, commerce, and contracting."
' 169
By rejecting the hostility with which choice-of-forum clauses had
traditionally been viewed by the courts, 170 and emphasizing the impor-
tance of certainty in consensual agreements,17 1 the Court in Bremen
made clear that choice-of-forum clauses will always be upheld in the ab-
sence of extreme hardship that would deprive the resisting party of a
meaningful day in court.172 Thus, the use of choice-of-forum provisions
to select where disputes arising from contractual agreements will be adju-
dicated is now accepted by the courts1 73 and lays the foundation for hon-
oring choice-of-forum provisions in lending agreements in California
commercial litigation.
The California Supreme Court has also held that forum-selection
clauses will be given effect absent a showing that enforcement would be
unfair or unreasonable. In Smith, Valentino & Smith v. Superior
Court,174 a contract between a Pennsylvania corporation doing business
in California and a California corporation included a forum-selection
clause requiring each party to litigate any disputes in the other's fo-
rum.171 The court, relying on Bremen, first disposed of the petitioner's
assertion that forum-selection clauses were "per se" invalid as constitut-
ing attempts to oust courts' of their jurisdiction by declaring that such
assertions are "'hardly more than a vestigal legal fiction' which '...
reflects something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other
tribunals.' "176 The court expressed unequivocal support for the use of
169. Id at 12-14.
170. Id at 9. See also Recent Decisions, Jurisdiction, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 309, 311-
12 (1972). Most of the resistance to honoring the provisions was built around the same argu-
ments that initially created difficulties in enforcing choice-of-law provisions. Some courts saw
forum selection as an ouster of jurisdiction and therefore a usurpation of the legislative func-
tion. Id
171. Id. at 13-14.
172. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18. The Court acknowledged that the forum selection clause in
question was negotiated at arm's length by sophisticated, knowledgeable businessmen, and
concluded that the clause was a vital part of the agreement on which the parties had relied in
contracting. Id. at 12.
173. See Docksider Ltd. v Sea Technology Ltd., 875 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989) for a recent
decision affirming this view. See also Pelleport Investors, Inc., v. Budco Quality Theatres,
Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 280 (9th Cir. 1984) (forum selection clause to be enforced absent evidence
of fraud, undue influence, overwhelming bargaining power or serious inconvenience in litigat-
ing in selected forum).
174. 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1976).
175. Id. at 494, 551 P.2d at 1208, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
176. Id. at 495, 551"P.2d at 1208, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Oil Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972)). In support of this view, Smith cited Central Contracting
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966). Smith, 17 Cal. 3d at 495, 551 P.2d
at 1209, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 377. In Central Contracting, the Third Circuit held "It is becoming
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such clauses by stating that forum-selection clauses will always be given
effect "unless the party assailing the clause establishes that.., the forum
selected would be unavailable or unable to accomplish substantial jus-
tice." '177 Finally, in upholding the clause in question, the court declared
that "[n]o satisfying reason . . . has been suggested why enforcement
should be denied a forum selection clause appearing in a contract entered
into freely and voluntarily by parties who have negotiated at arm's
length."1" 8 In this manner, California endorsed the use of forum-selec-
tion provisions in commercial agreements.
Under Bremen and Smith, the California courts are bound to re-
spect the wishes of parties who choose to have their cases heard in fo-
rums outside of the state. Absent overreaching behavior, the California
courts are powerless to undermine the parties' choice. Thus, by includ-
ing a choice-of-forum provision in their agreements, parties to commer-
cial lending agreements may effectively move their litigation out of
California into a forum which will respect their true intentions when en-
tering into such agreements. However, in order to do so, parties must
make sure that their court of choice has proper jurisdiction to hear their
case. This can be achieved through the use of consent-to-jurisdiction
clauses.
2. Consent-to-jurisdiction provisions
Consent-to-jurisdiction provisions are a second, equally important
tool for assuring that parties to commercial lending agreements can liti-
gate in a state which will honor their choice of law. By stipulating in
advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a particular state for any disputes
arising out of their agreements, parties can make sure that their choice of
venue, and thus, their choice of law, is implemented in enforcing the
terms under which they have contracted. Below is a brief summary of
relevant case law illustrating support for this proposition both at the fed-
eral level and in California.
The United States Supreme Court endorsed the validity of parties'
consent to jurisdiction in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szuk-
hent.'79 In Szukhent, the Court held that "it is settled .. that parties to
a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given
more widely recognized that for reasons of business or convenience the parties may have bar-
gained that all litigation arising out of their complex activity under a contract shall be drawn
into one jurisdiction." Central Contracting, 367 F.2d at 344-45.
177. Smith, 17 Cal. 3d at 494, 551 P.2d at 1208, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
178. Id. at 495, 551 P.2d at 1209, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
179. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
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court."18 In this manner, and in accord with its previous decision in
Bremen endorsing forum selection by the parties,18 1 the Court expanded
its view that parties may consent to the jurisdiction of a chosen court,
and thus determine where disputes arising out of their contracts will be
litigated.
The view that parties may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of a chosen court has also been endorsed by the California courts.
Berard Construction Co. v. Municipal Court"8 2 is a good example of a
California court upholding a consent-to-jurisdiction clause in a commer-
cial contract. The suit involved a lease agreement 8 3 under which the
plaintiff sued for breach of contract. 84 The defendant in the case moved
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.18 5 The relevant provision in the con-
tract- read as follows:
This lease is executed in Los Angeles, California, and shall be
construed under the laws of the State of California, and the
parties hereto agree that any action relating to this lease shall
be instituted and prosecuted in the courts in Los Angeles
County and each party waives the right to change of venue.
1 86
The municipal court called the paragraph "a venue provision, not a
jurisdiction provision."1 7 However, the appellate court reversed, hold-
ing that the provision was an "unequivocal consent to the jurisdiction of
the California courts," and that "[t]he waiver of the 'right to change of
venue' does not detract from the effect of this consent; it merely pre-
cludes either party from seeking to change the place of trial to another
court."1 ' Thus, the defendant's consent was given effect.18 9
As the cases illustrate, parties' ability to expressly submit to the ju-
risdiction of a court of their choosing is unquestioned. Thus, as with
choice-of-venue provisions, California courts must honor parties' con-
sent-to-jurisdiction clauses in commercial lending agreements.
180. Id at 315-16.
181. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9-10.
182. 49 Cal. App. 3d 710, 122 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1975).
183. Id. at 720, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
184. Id. at 712, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 720-21, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (emphasis omitted).
187. Id. at 721, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 722, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 833. The court stressed that the petitioner's claim that he
was unaware of, and had not read, the consent-to-jurisdiction provision in the contract was not
a legitimate defense to its enforcment. Id. Rather, the court stated, "One who signs a contract
must exercise, in doing so, the care of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances. If he
has failed to read it, its provisions bind him nevertheless." Id.
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3. The use of mandatory language
The prevailing view today is that choice-of-forum and consent-to-
jurisdiction provisions will always be honored where the provisions are
used concurrently in contractual agreements and the parties' choice of
forum is specified with mandatory language. 9 ' Authority supporting
this proposition can be found in a recent Ninth Circuit opinion rendered
in Docksider Ltd. v. Sea Technology, Ltd.'9
In Docksider, the parties entered an agreement whereby the plaintiff
was granted a license to distribute equipment manufactured by Sea
Tech. 92 The agreement provided as follows:
This agreement shall be deemed to be a contract made under
the laws of the State of Virginia, United States of America, and
for all purposes shall be interpreted in its entirety in accordance
with laws of said State. Licensee hereby agrees and consents to
the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Virginia. Venue of
any action brought hereunder shall be deemed to be in Glouces-
ter County, Virginia. 1
93
A dispute arose under the contract and Docksider filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. 194 Sea
Tech filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction on the basis of the forum-selection clause.1 95 The dis-
trict court granted the motion, and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.'
96
The sole issue before the appellate court in Docksider was whether
the venue clause contained in the contract was mandatory or permissive
and, therefore, whether or not the court was bound to honor it, or if the
parties' choice of venue was only one of many jurisdictions where suit
could be maintained.'97 Docksider contended that the clause was per-
missive, being merely a consent to the jurisdiction of Virginia. 98 Sea
Tech claimed that the clause was mandatory, vesting jurisdiction and
venue exclusively in the state court for the County of Gloucester, Vir-
190. See Docksider, 875 F.2d at 763; Sterling Forest Assoc. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 840
F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1988); Nascone v. Spudnuts, 735 F.2d 763, 764 (3d Cir. 1984); In re
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1979).
191. 875 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989).
192. Id. at 763.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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ginia.199 The majority in Docksider found that the clause was mandatory
and therefore required enforcement. 200 The court reasoned that "Dock-
sider not only consented to the jurisdiction of the state courts of Virginia,
but further agreed by mandatory language that the venue for all actions
arising out of the license agreement would be Gloucester County, Vir-
ginia."" Further, the court distinguished permissive consent to juris-
diction from mandatory consent by pointing to another Ninth Circuit
case, Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co.,202 to demonstrate an
example of a clause held to be permissive.2"3 The clause quoted from
Hunt Wesson read as follows:
"Buyer and Seller expressly agree that the laws of the State of
California shall govern the validity, construction, interpretation
and effect of this contract. The courts of California, County of
Orange, shall have jurisdiction over the parties in any action at
law relating to the subject matter of the interpretation of the
contract.
' 20
4
The critical difference between the language used in Docksider and that
in Hunt Wesson was that the clause in Docksider contained the additional
sentence that "[v]enue of any action brought hereunder shall be deemed
to be in Gloucester County, Virginia. 20 5 The Docksider court held that
this language required enforcement because Docksider had not only con-
sented to the jurisdiction of the state courts of Virginia, but had further
agreed by mandatory language that the venue for all actions arising out
of the licensing agreement would be Gloucester County, Virginia. 0 6 The
court stated that "in cases in which forum selection clauses have been
held to require litigation in a particular court, the language of the clauses
clearly required exclusive jurisdiction. 2 07 Further, the court found that
whether or not other states might otherwise have jurisdiction over ac-
tions arising from the agreement, all actions had to be filed and prose-
cuted in Virginia.20 8 In that respect, if the language in Docksider had
199. I
200. Id at 764.
201. Id.
202. 817 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1987).
203. Docksider, 875 F.2d at 763-64 (citing Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co.,
817 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1987)).
204. Id (quoting Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir.
1987)).
205. Id. at 764.
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir.
1987)) (emphasis in original).
208. Id.
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been more specific, the question as to proper venue might never have
arisen.2 ° 9
The prevailing rule that has emerged from Docksider and other
cases is that when consent-to-jurisdiction clauses are accompanied by
choice-of-forum clauses which require exclusive interpretation, then the
courts have no choice but to enforce the choice-of-forum clauses and
grant exclusive jurisdiction.21 0 As such, it appears that the use of such
clauses by the parties to lending agreements in conjunction with choice-
of-law provisions is the only viable method to assure that the parties'
choice of law will be honored. However, even in the face of these protec-
tive clauses, there is still one possible barrier to upholding the parties'
wishes that California courts may attempt to use to invalidate the parties'
choice of law. It involves the doctrine of unconscionability.
F Addressing the Potential Problem of Unconscionability
As indicated above, parties' ability to determine where disputes aris-
ing from their contracts will be litigated is endorsed by the modern case
law, both at the federal level and in California state-court decisions.211
Conversely, the ability to choose a situs for litigation which correlates to
the parties' choice of law should ensure that the choice of law will be
honored. Nonetheless, given the California courts' prior treatment of
parties' contractual choice of law in general,212 the courts' reaction to the
209. The ensuing litigation might have been prevented if the provision in question had been
made clearer by adding the statement: "This provision is mandatory and not permissive, unless
waived by lender."
210. Docksider, 875 F.2d at 764; see also Sterling Forest, 840 F.2d at 250 (following provi-
sion held mandatory: "This agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the
laws of the State of California and the parties agree that in any dispute jurisdiction and venue
shall be in California."); Nascone, 735 F.2d at 764 (following provision characterized as "rea-
sonable" and "explicit": "This franchise shall be construed according to the laws of the State
of Utah, and venue for any proceeding relating to the provisions shall be Salt Lake County,
State of Utah."); Fireman's Fund, 588 F.2d at 94 (provision which stated: "If the Sub-
contractor shall institute any suit or action for the enforcement of any of the obligations under
this agreement, the venue of such suit or action shall be laid in the County of Essex and State
of New Jersey," valid to lay venue in New Jersey). Thus, where venue is specified with
mandatory language, the clause will be enforced. When only jurisdiction is specified, the
clause will generally not be enforced without some further language indicating the parties'
intent to make jurisdiction exclusive. See Docksider, 875 F.2d at 764.
211. See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
212. See Mencor Enters. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 435, 235 Cal. Rptr.
464, 466 (1987) (court invalidates parties' choice of law of Colorado in lending agreement as
against public policy under California usury laws, despite legality under Colorado usury law);
Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 287-88, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230, 234
(1976) (court upholds parties' choice of California law in lending agreement, but qualifies cir-
cumstances under which parties' choices will be honored as per Restatement (Second) of Con-
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methodology proposed above will probably be hostile.
California courts could attempt to invalidate mandatory choice-of-
forum or consent-to-jurisdiction provisions by invoking the doctrine of
unconscionability. In that way, parties' ability to move commercial lend-
ing litigation out of California to a state which will honor their choice of
law could be frustrated. However, through proper draftsmanship and
careful consideration of the process used in creating financing agree-
ments, the parties should be able to avoid judicial invalidation of the
proposed provisions.
This part of the Comment discusses the concept of unconscionabil-
ity and how it has been used in California to invalidate contractual
clauses. The Comment further discusses the manner in which unconscio-
nability has been applied in invalidating procedural provisions in lending
agreements, and concludes that unconscionability could be used by the
courts in California to invalidate choice-of-forum or consent-to-jurisdic-
tion provisions in lending agreements, thus invalidating the parties'
choice of law in the process.
1. The meaning of unconscionability
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that:
If [a] court as a matter of law finds [a] contract or any clause of
[a] contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconsciona-
ble clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscion-
able clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
213
While the Code does not attempt a precise definition of unconscionabil-
ity,214 the concept has been described in case law as "an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties [to a transaction] together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party. ' 215 Phrased another way, unconscionability is said to have both a
flict of Laws); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d. 668,
673, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (1971) (parties' choice of New York law to govern forfeiture agree-
ment struck down by court as against public policy).
213. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987). While Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code applies
to sales contracts, it provides a general illustration of the manner in which the concept may be
used in invalidating any or all clauses in a contractual agreement.
214. Id. The Code does mention, however, that the "basic test is whether, in light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at
the time of the making of the contract." Id. official comment 1. See also J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 406-07 (3d ed. 1987).
215. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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"procedural" element and a "substantive" element.216
The procedural element of unconscionability focuses on two factors:
"oppression" and "surprise. ' 217 Oppression has been defined as gross
inequality of bargaining power resulting in no real negotiation and thus
placing one party in a position where it is forced to accept the terms of
the contract as offered.218 Surprise, on the other hand, entails the extent
to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in
a printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed
terms.219 Characteristically, procedural unconscionability involves a
form contract, drafted by a party with a superior bargaining position, 220
and which entails terms which are not read or understood by the non-
drafting party.221
Substantive unconscionability has been discussed in cases in terms of
"overly harsh" or "one-sided" results.222 However, one commentator
has pointed out that "unconscionability turns not only on a 'one-sided'
result, but also on an absence of 'justification' for it."' 223 This means that
substantive unconscionability must be evaluated as of the time a contract
is made.224 Thus, if a contract may be characterized as an allocation of
risks between the parties, then a contractual term is "substantively sus-
pect" if it reallocates the risks of a bargain in an objectively unreasonable
or unexpected manner.225
Unconscionability has most commonly been used by the courts in
consumer sales transactions, where the opportunity for oppressive terms
seems the greatest. 226 Additionally, most of the cases in which uncon-
216. Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.B. Enters., 58 A.D.2d 482,
487 n.4, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 431 n.4 (1977); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967).
217. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
121 (1982). See also Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, 527 F.2d 571, 575 (8th Cir. 1975)
("Two important considerations are whether there is a gross inequality of bargaining power
... and whether the aggrieved party was made aware of ... the provision in question.").
218. A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (citing Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 245, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
219. See Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC
Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REv. 28, 43 (1977); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability,
78 YALE L.J. 757, 764 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 931, 943 (1969).
220. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 214, at 418.
221. A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22 (1982).
222. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 462, 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (1971);
Shroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 260, 544 P.2d 20, 23 (1975).
223. Eddy, supra note 219, at 45.
224. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
225. A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
226. E. FARNSWORTH & A. MCCORMACK, CoNTRAcTs 313 (1982).
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scionability has arisen involve a combination of both procedural and sub-
stantive unconscionability 27 and it is generally agreed that "if more of
one is present, then less of the other is required. '228 On the whole, how-
ever, judges have been cautious in applying the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility "recognizing that the parties often must make their contract
quickly, that bargaining power will rarely be equal, and that courts are
i-equipped to deal with problems of unequal distribution of wealth in
society.
'229
2. California case law
Although little authority exists in California case law which deals
with unconscionability in commercial contracts, one leading case is A &
M Produce v. FMC Corp. 3' InA & M Produce, a produce company sued
an agricultural equipment company from which it had bought a weight-
sizing machine, 31 alleging breach of express and implied warranties and
misrepresentation.232 The defendant corporation had printed the agree-
ment between the parties on both sides of a single sheet of paper and had
included on the reverse side three key provisions. 33 The first was enti-
tled "Seller's Remedies," outlining the buyer's obligation to pay the
seller's reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with any default by the
buyer; the second was entitled "Warranty," containing a disclaimer of
warranties in bold print; and the third was labeled "Disclaimer of Conse-
quential Damages," stating in smaller print that the seller was not liable
for consequential damages arising out of the agreement.23 a The weight-
sizing machine, purchased by A & M to process tomatoes, did not per-
form as promised, causing A & M to lose hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars. 35 In the ensuing litigation, FMC argued that the contract clauses
were enforceable as agreed upon and that FMC was therefore not liable
for the plaintiff's losses.236 The court, however, disagreed with FMC's
227. Id. at 315.
228. Id. Not all unreasonable risk allocations are to be considered unconscionable. A & M
Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122. Rather, "enforceability of [a] clause
is tied to the procedural aspects of unconscionability such that the greater the unfair suprise or
inequality of bargaining power, the less unreasonable the risk reallocation which will be toler-
ated." Id. (citations omitted).
229. E. FARNSWORTH & A. MCCORMACK, supra note 226, at 316.
230. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
231. Id at 478, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
232. Id. at 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
233. I.d at 479, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
234. Id
235. Id. at 481, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
236. Id at 481-82, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19.
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contention, and held for A & M, stating that the contract clauses were
unconscionable and therefore void.237
With regard to procedural unconscionability, the court found that
although most courts generally view businessmen as possessing a greater
degree of commercial understanding and greater economic muscle than
the average consumer, some inexperienced businessmen may still be un-
fairly "surprised" by the terms of a contract.238 In that regard, the court
pointed out, the plaintiff had testified that he had never read the back of
the contract and was therefore unaware of the disclaimers on which the
defendant relied.2 39 Additionally, the court found that FMC made no
attempt to inform A & M of the clauses in question and although the
printing on the warranty disclaimer was conspicuous, the court found
that the terms of the related consequential damages exclusion were
not. 2' Based on those factors, the court found that the first prong of
procedural unconscionability had been met, and the plaintiff was indeed
unfairly surprised.2 4 1
After dealing with the issue of unfair surprise, the court then ad-
ressed the second prong of procedural unconscionability which deals
with oppression.242 The court found that although A & M was a fair-
sized farming operation, it had been dealing with a major corporation on
whose expertise it had relied in agreeing to the contract's terms. 243 More
importantly, the court observed, the terms on the FMC contract were
standard boilerplate and non-negotiable. 2' The court held, therefore,
that the contract did not truly constitute a "bargain" between the parties
because it was based on unequal bargaining power, and on that basis,
oppression was present in the contract.245
Finally, the A & M Produce court looked to the contract to deter-
mine whether it was also substantively unconscionable.246 The court
found that by including the warranty disclaimer in the contract, FMC
was, in essence, guarantying nothing about the product's performance.24 7
The court further found that "[s]ince a product's performance forms the
fundamental basis for a sales contract, it is patently unreasonable to as-
237. Id. at 485, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
238. Id. at 489, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
239. Id. at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
240. Id., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
241. Id
242. Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id
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sume that a buyer would purchase a standardized mass-produced prod-
uct from an industry seller without any enforceable performance
standards." '248 That factor, along with A & M's reliance on FMC's ex-
pertise in recommending the equipment, prompted the court to hold the
warranty disclaimer commercially unreasonable and therefore void.249
3. Unconscionability in lending agreements-a focus
on unfair surprise
In utilizing the doctrine of unconscionability in a commercial sales
contract, the A & M Produce court emphasized the need to establish all
of the elements of unconscionability in order to invalidate what it consid-
ered commercially unreasonable provisions within that agreement.
2 50
However, case law indicates that when dealing with procedural provi-
sions within lending agreements, other courts have been willing to invali-
date those types of provisions on the basis of unfair surprise alone.25 1 In
that regard, parties' ability to move the situs of lending litigation away
from California in order to ensure that their choice of law will be
honored could be frustrated by the courts in California based solely on
procedural unconscionability. A recent case involving the invalidation of
a jury waiver provision in a lending agreement by the federal bankruptcy
court in Illinois illustrates this point well.
Unsecured Creditors' Committee ex rel. Heartland Chemicals Corp.
v. Banque Paribas (In re Heartland Chemicals Corp.),25 2 involved a pro-
vision for the waiver of a jury trial in a lending agreement between an
Illinois corporation and a French bank. 213 The provision was printed in
capital letters and located on the page proceeding the signature page. 4
The court held, however, that the provision was unenforceable because
the debtor's waiver of a jury trial was not made knowingly and volunta-
rily.255  First, the court said that although the waiver was printed in
capital letters, it was buried in several other provisions both preceding
248. Id.
249. Id. at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125. The court found that FMC either impliedly or
expressly warrantied the product it sold to A & M. Id. On that basis, the court also held that
the provision excluding consequential damages was unreasonable and therefore unenforceable
since FMC had breached that warranty. Id. Consequential damages for the plaintiff were,
therefore, "explicitly obvious" under the circumstances. Id.
250. Id. at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
251. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Comm. ex rel. Heartland Chems. Corp. v, Banque
Paribas (In re Heartland Chems. Corp.), 103 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. C.D. IM. 1989).
252. 103 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. C.D. II. 1989).
253. Id. at 1019.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1020.
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and following it which were also in capitals.2"6 Second, the court pointed
to the fact that the part of the contract that the jury waiver was included
in was labeled "Submission to Jurisdiction: Waiver of Bond," which
gave the borrower no notice of its consent to jury waiver.2" 7 Finally, the
court observed that although the provision was located on the page pre-
ceding the signature page, that location placed it on the nineteenth page
of a twenty-page document.2" 8 On those grounds, the court invalidated
the provision.25 9
Heartland Chemicals appears to illustrate that when dealing with
procedural provisions within lending agreements, the only valid basis for
the invalidation of a procedural provision is unfair surprise. The under-
lying rationale is based on the nature of procedural provisions. Proce-
dural provisions focus on the manner in which an agreement is enforced,
rather than what is actually contained in the agreement. In that respect,
it seems that absent unreasonable substantive terms within an agreement,
the courts would like to encourage the enforcement of contracts in the
most effective manner possible. An attempt to invalidate a procedural
provision in any agreement which has been knowingly entered into by
both sides would seem to circumvent the very purpose of entering into
the agreement in the first place. Thus, procedural provisions should al-
ways be enforced in the absence of unfair surprise. However, there are
other, more general reasons for focusing on unfair surprise rather than
oppression or substantive unconscionability when dealing with provi-
sions which are specific to lending agreements.
First, oppression deals with unequal bargaining power, an issue of
great concern in standard sales agreements, but of little importance with
respect to financing arrangements. In a standard sales agreement, the
seller is in control of his own destiny, whereas in a lending agreement,
the lender is not. For instance, if one business sells a defective product
and attempts to extricate itself through disclaimers contained in a sales
agreement which are unknown to the buyer at the time of contracting,
the law naturally disfavors such an arrangement because the buyer is not
getting the benefit of the bargain. 2 ° In cases where unequal bargaining
exists, the seller's actions can be viewed as even more egregious because
the seller can often control the quality of the product he sells and should
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1019-20.
258. Id. at 1020.
259. Id.
260. See E. FARNSWORTH & A. MCCORMACK, supra note 226, at 812-13. The benefit of
the bargain relates to the "expectation interest" which arises when a party expects to receive
the value of performance contracted for. Id.
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therefore be held accountable in the event that the product does not per-
form as represented. However, oppression does not apply in this manner
to lenders and borrowers.
Lenders take much greater risks than do sellers of traditional prod-
ucts because it is the borrower's performance, rather than the lender's,
which controls the success or failure of any given transaction. In that
respect, the lender can only attempt to mitigate risk by making assump-
tions as to an individual business's abilities to perform under an agree-
ment, and then to set interest rates accordingly.261 Additionally, the
lender has a stake in the success of the borrower. Therefore, it is in the
lender's best interest to try and put together a workable agreement. This
type of incentive does not exist in a traditional buyer and seller relation-
ship other than in the hopes of the seller for repeat sales. Finally, all
things being equal, the purpose of including choice-of-forum, choice-of-
law and consent-to-jurisdiction clauses in lending agreements has little to
do with the terms of the agreement other than to ensure that it is en-
forced. On that basis, there is no valid basis for a borrower to claim that
the inclusion of such provisions is oppressive or substantively unfair.
For the reasons stated above, the focus of this Comment is prevent-
ing judicial invalidation of procedural provisions (such as parties' choice
of law, venue, or consent to jurisdiction) in lending agreements solely on
the basis of unfair surprise.
V. RECOMMENDATION
A. Drafting the Agreement
The resisting parties in both A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.262
and Unsecured Creditors' Committee ex rel. Heartland Chemicals Corp.
v. Banque Paribas (In re Heartland Chemicals Corp.)263 argued success-
fully that their lack of awareness of procedural clauses within contracts
justified voiding those provisions."6 However, the unfair surprise which
supported invalidation of the contractual provisions in those cases is eas-
ily remedied. Moreover, those remedies can be applied without hesita-
261. See E. COMPTON, INSIDE COMMERCIAL BANKING 101-04 (2d ed. 1983); D. AUSTIN,
D. HAKALA & T. SCAMPINI, MODERN BANKING 194 (1985); COMMITTEE ON DEVELOP-
MENTS IN BUSINESS FINANCING OF THE SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND Busi-
NESS LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TERM LOAN HANDBOOK 4 (J. McCann ed. 1983).
262. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
263. 103 Bankr. 1018 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989).
264. Heartland Chemicals, 103 Bankr. at 1019; A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490,
186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
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tion to commercial lending agreements which include parties' choice-of-
law, choice-of-forum, and consent-to-jurisdiction provisions.
This part of the Comment proposes a manner in which provisions
within lending agreements may be written which should compel the Cali-
fornia courts to honor the parties' choice of a situs for litigation which, in
turn, will honor the parties' choice of law. First, this part of the Com-
ment proposes procedural safeguards which should be employed by par-
ties to ensure that both sides are aware of all key terms within their
agreements. Next, the Comment suggests the manner in which those
provisions should be drafted within an actual lending agreement. Fi-
nally, the Comment provides sample provisions which illustrate the
methodology suggested.
1. Procedural safeguards
When entering into a commercial lending agreement, both parties
must make sure that the other side is aware of all key terms contained
within the agreement. The best and most effective manner in which this
can be accomplished is by agreeing in advance that both parties will util-
ize the services of attorneys in drafting agreements and that both attor-
neys will make sure that the other side is aware of any key terms either
party is likely to invoke in the event of litigation. In commercial lending
agreements, this may entail an explanation of the choice-of-law, consent-
to-jurisdiction and mandatory choice-of-forum clauses by the lender's at-
torney to the borrower's attorney.265 Additionally, documentation sup-
porting meetings in which the key terms are discussed, if possible, should
be maintained. Such documentation may simply entail a memo to a su-
perior informing them of the progress of the proposed transaction. How-
ever, the effect will have been to have laid the initial groundwork to
defend against a claim of unfair suprise by a resisting party should litiga-
tion later arise regarding the manner in which the contract was formed.
2. The writing
Supervising the manner in which the contract is formed is the first
step in preventing invalidation of key clauses in a lending agreement.
However, as the cases discussed illustrate, the structure of the agreement
itself is crucial to its eventual enforcement.266 There are several safe-
265. Although this type of arrangement may simply prove too cumbersome, the parties
should discuss and subsequently acknowledge at least the presence of the clauses within the
agreement.
266. See, e.g., Heartland, 103 Bankr. at 1019-20; A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490-
91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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guards which may be employed in drafting lending agreements which
should ensure that the parties' choice-of-law, choice-of-forum, and con-
sent-to-jurisdiction clauses will be honored.
First, choice-of-forum, choice-of-law and consent-to-jurisdiction
clauses should be placed in any lending agreement in the most conspicu-
ous manner possible. The clauses should each be labeled separately
within their respective sections in the agreement, and those labels should
be underlined to give both parties clear notice as to their presence. 67
Additionally, the clauses should be placed as close as possible to the be-
ginning of the agreement.
Second, the clauses should each be printed completely in bold type
with capital letters. To avoid confusion, the clauses should be the only
provisions within the agreement printed in this manner. This should not
cause a problem since other provisions within lending agreements nor-
mally contain elements which are negotiated-such as the amount, rate
and term of the financing-and therefore do not lend themselves to un-
fair suprise.
Lastly, the provisions should be initialed by the borrower when the
agreement is signed to signify that the borrower has read and under-
stands them. In this way, along with the utilization of attorneys to ex-
plain the terms of the agreement and to obtain parties' assent, a lender
should be able to prove unequivocally that there was no unfair surprise.
Below are sample provisions which could be included in lending
agreements which may help to assure that the parties' intent to move
litigation out of California will be honored by the California courts.
While not dispositive as to the courts' ultimate treatment of the parties'
choices, these samples are intended to provide guidance to those enter-
prises hoping to better guarantee the enforcement of their commercial
lending agreements as intended. The waiver of right to forum non con-
veniens is included in the sample as a further precautionary measure in
assuring that not only California, but also the chosen court will honor the
parties' wishes. 68 Parties may be best served to include such a provision
267. One court has suggested that separate headings highlighting particular provisions in a
contract will alleviate any unconscionability problems. See Dorman v. International Harvester
Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1975).
268. The possibility that the action could be dismissed relying on a motion for forum non
conveniens seems highly unlikely given the substantial burden on the moving party to prove
inconvenience and the availability of a more convenient forum. See Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) ("there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the
plaintiff's choice of forum, which may be overcome only when.., factors clearly point to-
wards trial in [another] forum"); see also Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) ("unless
the balance [of the litigants' interests are] strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
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in an actual lending agreement in a separate section as per the recom-
mendations above.
B. Sample provisions
GOVERNING LAW. THIS AGREEMENT, THE NOTES, AND
THE ANCILLARY DOCUMENTS SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE
BEEN MADE IN THE STATE OF AND THE
VALIDITY OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE NOTES, AND THE
ANCILLARY DOCUMENTS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION,
INTERPRETATION, AND ENFORCEMENT THEREOF, AND
THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES THERETO SHALL BE
DETERMINED UNDER, GOVERNED BY, AND CONSTRUED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERNAL LAWS OF THE STATE
OF , WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CONFLICTS OF
LAW RULES OF THE STATE IN WHICH SUIT IS INITIATED
PERTAINING TO THIS AGREEMENT.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE. TO THE EXTENT
PERMITTED BY LAW, THE PARTIES HERETO AGREE THAT
ALL ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS ARISING IN CONNECTION
WITH THIS AGREEMENT, THE NOTES, OR THE ANCILLARY
DOCUMENTS, SHALL BE TRIED AND LITIGATED ONLY IN
THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS LOCATED IN THE
COUNTY OF _, STATE OF , OR, AT THE
SOLE OPTION OF LENDER, IN ANY OTHER COURT IN
WHICH LENDER SHALL INITIATE LEGAL OR EQUITABLE
PROCEEDINGS AND WHICH HAS SUBJECT MATTER
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed"). To begin with, the parties will have chosen the
state where litigation is undertaken, and thus, absent overreaching behavior, the moving party
would be hard-pressed to demonstrate why that choice should not be honored. Additionally,
there is little reason to assume that the moving party could show why any other state is more
convenient than the chosen state, since one of the parties would have to be burdened by litigat-
ing there at least as much as it would be by litigating in the chosen state. The fairest resolu-
tion, then, would be to honor the parties' original choice.
If suit is initiated or removed to federal court, the possibility then exists that a resisting
party might attempt to have the case transferred to a "more convenient forum" under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955), the United States
Supreme Court held that since section 1404(a) involves the transfer of a proceeding, rather
than dismissal, Congress, by enacting the statute, "intended to permit courts to grant transfers
on a lesser showing of inconvenience." Id. at 32. However, for the reasons stated above, it is
extremely unlikely that under section 1404(a), a case involving a contract which includes a
mandatory choice-of-forum clause and a consent-to-jurisdiction provision could be transferred.
As a preventative step to provide maximum assurance that the chosen court will honor the
parties' wishes, a waiver of any right to bring a motion of forum non conveniens could be
included in the provisions regarding jurisdiction and venue.
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JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY. THE
PARTIES FURTHER AGREE THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED
CHOICE OF VENUE IS TO BE CONSIDERED MANDATORY
AND NOT PERMISSIVE IN NATURE, THEREBY PRECLUDING
THE POSSIBILITY OF LITIGATION IN ANY JURISDICTION
OTHER THAN THAT SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION
OR BY THE LENDER. BORROWER AND BANK, TO
THE EXTENT THEY MAY LEGALLY DO SO, HEREBY WAIVE
ANY RIGHT EACH MAY HAVE TO ASSERT THE DOCTRINE
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS OR TO OBJECT TO VENUE TO
THE EXTENT ANY PROCEEDING BROUGHT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION AND
STIPULATE THAT THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
LOCATED IN THE COUNTY OF , STATE OF
SHALL HAVE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION AND
VENUE OVER SUCH PARTY 'FOR THE PURPOSE OF
LITIGATING ANY SUCH DISPUTE, CONTROVERSY, OR
PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS
AGREEMENT, THE NOTES, OR THE ANCILLARY
DOCUMENTS. TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW,
SERVICE OF PROCESS SUFFICIENT FOR PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN ANY ACTION AGAINST BORROWER MAY
BE MADE BY REGISTERED OR CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN
RECEIPT REQUESTED, TO ITS ADDRESS INDICATED IN
EXHIBIT ATTACHED HERETO. BORROWER
AGREES THAT ANY FINAL JUDGMENT RENDERED AGAINST
IT IN ANY ACTION OR PROCEEDING SHALL BE
CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE SUBJECT OF SUCH FINAL
JUDGMENT AND MAY BE ENFORCED IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS IN ANY MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.
269
VI. CONCLUSION
Choice-of-law provisions serve a useful purpose by providing cer-
tainty, predictability and uniformity of result in the event of litigation
regarding the enforcement of commercial contracts. 27 0 Knowing in ad-
vance which law will govern their contracts enables businesses to better
plan their affairs and thus, to operate more efficiently. 71
269. D. SCHECHTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ASSET-BASED COMMERCIAL FINANCE
25 (1989) (reprinted and modified with permission).
270. Horowitz, supra note 5, at 765; Friedler, supra note 6, at 471.
271. Horowitz, supra note 5, at 765, Friedler, supra note 6, at 471.
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The need for certainty in the enforcement of commercial lending
agreements is even greater than that required in most other types of com-
mercial contracts. By their nature, lending agreements involve long-term
commitments in which the success of lenders is dependent on the finan-
cial stability of their borrowers and on the ability to enforce agreements
should that stability falter.
Traditional approaches to choice of law focus on state sovereignty
rather than the wishes of the interested parties entering into contracts.
Traditional approaches do not always uphold the justified expectations of
parties entering into contracts and therefore can sometimes undermine
the primary goals of contract law.272 Those approaches are thus inade-
quate in determining the validity of parties' contractual choice of law.
One approach to the interpretation of contractual choice-of-law
provisions which focuses specifically on honoring the parties' choice of
law is the autonomy rule.273 The autonomy rule, with limited excep-
tions, forces courts to honor the parties' choice of law in contractual
agreements. 274 Therefore, the autonomy rule is the best rule to follow
when interpreting parties' choice of law because it is the only rule which
truly upholds the parties' settled expectations.
The courts in California have abandoned traditional approaches to
conflict problems involving parties' choice of law in favor of the ap-
proach of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws.275 On its
face, the Restatement approach appears to focus on party autonomy.
276
However, the Restatement approach contains exceptions which have
been used by the courts in California to circumvent the wishes of the
parties in regard to choice of law.277 Thus, the use of the Restatement
approach by the California courts has created much uncertainty sur-
rounding the enforceability of parties' choice of law in lending and other
contractual agreements.
272. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
273. Friedler, supra note 6, at 474.
274. Id. at 478; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
275. Mencor Enters., Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 190 Cal. App. 3d 432, 436, 235 Cal. Rptr.
464, 466 (1987); Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 287-88, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 230, 233-34 (1976); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App.
3d 668, 673, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (1971). See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187 (1971).
276. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
277. See Mencor Enters, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 432, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 464 (court invalidated
parties' choice of Colorado law in lending agreement as against public policy under California
usury laws, despite legality under Colorado usury law); Frame, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 97 Cal.
Rptr. at 811 (parties' choice of New York law to govern forfeiture agreement struck down by
court as against public policy).
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The costs of uncertainty in the enforcement of lending agreements
created by the California courts can be high. Uncertainty could force
lenders to tighten credit or raise interest rates, potentially depriving fi-
nancing to businesses which rely on lenders for needed working capital in
their day-to-day operations. An inability to obtain financing could force
some of those enterprises out of business. Additionally, an inability to
accurately gauge risk due to uncertainty could impact the lenders them-
selves. In the worst case, this could create societal costs which would far
outweigh the measures needed to prevent uncertainty.278
The solution to avoiding those costs by ensuring that parties' choice
of law will be honored and lending agreements will be enforced as agreed
upon is to move litigation arising from lending agreements out of the
California courts and into the courts of the state whose laws have been
chosen by the parties to govern their agreements. This can be accom-
plished through the use of mandatory choice-of-venue and consent-to-
jurisdiction clauses included in the agreements.
The use of provisions to move litigation out of the California courts
is the first step in ensuring that the parties' intent will be recognized.
However, only through proper draftsmanship and careful consideration
of the process used in creating financing agreements will parties' choices
be honored. In that manner, the expectations of the parties can be up-
held, and the certainty that is essential in all commercial transactions
will be provided.
Mark J Kelson*
278. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
* The author wishes to thank Professors Dan Schechter and Edith Friedler for their help
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